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FORSAKEN HEROES: COVID-19 AND FRONTLINE
ESSENTIAL WORKERS
James J. Brudney*
“Who sees with equal eye, as God of all, A hero perish, or a sparrow fall,
Atoms or systems into ruin hurl’d, And now a bubble burst, and now a
world.”
– An Essay on Man, Epistle 1, Alexander Pope (1734)
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INTRODUCTION
Tin Aye emigrated from a refugee camp in Thailand to Colorado in 2007
with her husband and two children. She worked at the JBS meatpacking
plant in Greeley. On May 17, 2020, she died of complications from
COVID-19 after being hospitalized on a ventilator for seven weeks. At the
time, Aye, age 60, was the eighth JBS Greeley employee (and seventh
worker) confirmed to have died from COVID-19; 316 plant workers had
tested positive by May 17.1
Sandra Kunz, a Walmart cashier, died on April 20, 2020, from
complications related to the coronavirus. Despite being 72 years old with a
lung condition, Kunz continued working — her husband was injured and out
of work, and the couple had bills to pay. Public health and worker safety
experts recognize the register as the most dangerous place in the store.
Cashiers work at arm’s length from customers all day, making social
distancing virtually impossible.2
When the COVID-19 pandemic engulfed the United States in early 2020,
the concept of essential workers rose to prominence. While the category
became a focus for media coverage and political debate, its definition and
boundaries have been somewhat fluid. According to the Department of
Homeland Security Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Advisory Memorandum, the category covers 17 broad groups of workers,
amounting to almost half of the workforce.3 And the CISA guidance,

* Joseph Crowley Chair in Labor and Employment Law, Fordham University School of Law.
Thanks to Rebecca Eisenbrey, Jennifer Gordon, Anton Hajjar, Nelson Lichtenstein, and Ann
Rosenthal for valuable comments on an earlier draft; to Ian Bollag-Miller, Katarina Resar
Krasulova, and Janet Kearney for superb research assistance; and to Fordham Law School for
generous financial support. This Article is current as of November 3, 2020.
1. See Jeremy Harlan, A Refugee and New Grandmother Was the Eighth Employee at a
Colorado Meat Packing Plant to Die from Coronavirus, CNN (May 18, 2020, 5:00 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/18/us/jbs-employee-dies/index.html
[https://perma.cc/2KRJ-X3SV].
2. See Nathaniel Meyersohn, This Is the Most Dangerous Place in the Grocery Store,
CNN
(May
1,
2020,
7:56
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/30/business/grocery-stores-coronavirus-cashiers/index.html
[https://perma.cc/P44D-WA8E].
3. CISA is the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency within the Department
of Homeland Security. See Advisory Memorandum from Christopher C. Krebs, Dir.,
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Sec. Agency (CISA) (May 19, 2020) [hereinafter Advisory
Memorandum],
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Version_3.1_CISA_Guidance_on_Esse
ntial_Critical_Infrastructure_Workers.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GRE-FTXQ]; see also US
States with the Most Essential Workers, UNITED WAY NAT’L CAP. AREA,
https://unitedwaynca.org/stories/us-states-essential-workers/ [https://perma.cc/MHE3-82Z6]
(last visited Nov. 8, 2020).
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intended to be overly broad,4 has spawned a range of state responses as to
what constitutes “essential work.”5
These varied definitional approaches bypass an important distinction
among essential workers: those who basically work from home versus those
who must travel to their jobs and interact with coworkers and the public on
a regular basis. The 40% of essential workers who can work from home
have not been unduly vulnerable or precarious.6 If anything, they were
among the fortunate who could count on reasonably steady income in a safe
workspace at a time when one-quarter of the working population was
experiencing unemployment or pay reductions.7 On the other hand, roughly
60% of essential workers — often referred to as frontline essential (FE) —
can only do their jobs in person.
FE workers are the subject of this Article. The health and safety risks that
they endure in service to the economy and country have made them heroes,
supportively portrayed in the media and celebrated in cities at a designated
early evening hour.8 What these heroes have not received is adequate
workplace health and safety rights or protections.
4. See Advisory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 5.
5. Some states embraced the federal guidance as definitional but added more categories
of workers. See, e.g., Order of Alabama State Health Officer Suspending Certain Public
Gatherings Due to Risk of Infection by COVID-19 (Apr. 3, 2020),
https://governor.alabama.gov/assets/2020/04/Final-Statewide-Order-4.3.2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/42B5-KMST] (adding religious entities). Other states deferred to the federal
guidance. See, e.g., Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.14.20.01 (Apr. 2, 2020) (adopting the definition
of “critical infrastructure” from CISA). And still other states endorsed the CISA categories
but defined them more narrowly with distinct relevance to their own economies. See, e.g.,
Cal. Exec. Order No. 33-20 (Mar. 19, 2020); Essential Workforce, CAL. ST. PUB. HEALTH
OFFICER
(Apr.
28,
2020),
https://covid19.ca.gov/img/EssentialCriticalInfrastructureWorkers.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9QPS-5ZFN].
6. Bankers are an example of essential workers operating from home; they process
emergency-relief loans for small businesses and coach customers by phone as they navigate
online or mobile banking. See Laura Alix, Coronavirus Through the Eyes of Front-Line
Bankers,
AM.
BANKER
(May
13,
2020,
9:30
PM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/coronavirus-through-the-eyes-of-front-line-bankers
[https://perma.cc/9WNS-K47X]. One academic report identifies the CISA guidance as
covering over half the total workforce, with 40% of that total not needing to work on the front
lines on a regular basis. See Francine D. Blau et al., Essential and Frontline Workers in the
COVID-19
Crisis,
ECONOFACT
(Apr.
30,
2020),
https://econofact.org/essential-and-frontline-workers-in-the-covid-19-crisis
[https://perma.cc/NDN3-YGUZ].
7. See Andrew Soergel, Survey: 1 in 4 Americans Has Lost Job or Income to
Coronavirus,
U.S.
NEWS
&
WORLD
REP.
(Apr.
8,
2020),
https://www.usnews.com/news/economy/articles/2020-04-08/1-in-4-americans-has-lost-jobor-income-to-coronavirus-survey [https://perma.cc/DP2H-QLLB].
8. See Peter Marks, The Nightly Ovation for Hospital Workers May Be New York’s
Greatest
Performance,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
6,
2020,
6:15
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/theater_dance/the-nightly-ovation-for-hospi
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In addition to individuals like Tin Aye and Sandra Kunz, FE workers
encompass at least six identified frontline industry groupings: (1) grocery,
convenience, and drug store workers; (2) healthcare professionals and
support personnel; (3) public transit workers; (4) janitors and building
cleaners; (5) trucking, warehouse, and postal workers; and (6) childcare and
social service workers.9 They produce, process, or deliver vital goods and
services at their regular workplaces, interacting with patients, customers,
clients, and fellow workers.
There are more than 30 million FE workers in the United States,
comprising over 20% of the workforce.10 Although demographic trends vary
across industries, FE workers are overall less white, more Black, more
female, more foreign born, and more likely to live in low-income families
than the U.S. population as a whole.11 FE workers also bear disproportionate
health risks — as evidenced by higher rates of infection, serious illness, and
death.12
In the face of these risks, there has been a conspicuous lack of federal
leadership in protecting FE workers. One federal law enacted during the
tal-workers-may-be-new-yorks-greatest-performance/2020/04/06/e443195c-7795-11ea-a130
-df573469f094_story.html [https://perma.cc/7UPK-DPFC]; Janet I. Tu, Seattleites
Encouraged to Make ‘Joyful Noise’ Thursday Night in Appreciation of Front Line Workers
in Coronavirus Pandemic, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 26, 2020, 10:28 AM),
https://www.seattletimes.com/life/seattleites-encouraged-to-make-joyful-noise-at-8-p-m-ton
ight-in-celebration-of-front-line-workers-in-the-coronavirus-pandemic/
[https://perma.cc/58RU-5LZC].
9. See HYE JIN RHO ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RSCH., A BASIC DEMOGRAPHIC
PROFILE OF WORKERS IN FRONTLINE INDUSTRIES 5–6 (2020) [hereinafter CEPR REPORT],
https://cepr.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2020-04-Frontline-Workers.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QLF6-ZG2C]. There are a multitude of figures circulating regarding the
number and demographic breakdown of FE workers. The Article relies on data compiled by
the Center for Economic and Policy Research, which uses American Community Survey Data
from 2014–2018 and defines frontline industries under the six groupings in the text. These
groupings are also used by the New York City Comptroller, among others. See OFF. OF THE
N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, NEW YORK CITY’S FRONTLINE WORKERS (2020) [hereinafter NYC
FRONTLINE
WORKERS],
https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/Frontline_Workers_032020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G7WA-DN3N]. For more details on the six groupings, see infra Part I.
10. See CEPR REPORT, supra note 9, at 7 tbl.1. For a more expansive view of FE workers
and essential workers overall, see Adie Tomer & Joseph W. Kane, To Protect Frontline
Workers During and After COVID-19, We Must Define Who They Are, BROOKINGS (June 10,
2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/to-protect-frontline-workers-during-and-after-covid-19we-must-define-who-they-are/ [https://perma.cc/2LZD-JDCT] (identifying 50 million FE
workers, 55% of 90 million total essential workers, and over 30% of total U.S. employment).
11. See CEPR REPORT, supra note 9, at 3–4, 7 tbl.1. In New York City, more than 50%
of frontline workers are foreign born, which is almost three times the national average. See
NYC FRONTLINE WORKERS, supra note 9, at 2–4; see also CEPR REPORT, supra note 9, at 7
tbl.1 (finding 17.3% of frontline workers are foreign born).
12. See infra notes 44–52 and accompanying text.
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pandemic provides for paid sick leave, but only to a fraction of those working
in FE jobs — and the Department of Labor (DOL) has weakened the
provisions Congress approved.13 With respect to protections such as
mandatory personal protective equipment (PPE), social distancing
requirements, hazard or premium pay, and application of existing or
emergency safety standards, DOL has promulgated mild forms of guidance
that offer little meaningful protection and has engaged in virtually no
enforcement.14 A handful of state and local governments have taken partial
steps to fill in these large gaps.15 Overall, the law’s response has been
fragmented and disappointing.
Some additional protections have resulted from collective bargaining or
lobbying efforts by unions.16 Of particular relevance are union efforts to
secure congressional protection for the airline industry that covers up to two
million employees.17 These major industry-wide payroll and job protective
provisions differ dramatically from the law’s traditional employer-specific
responses to job losses and pandemic conditions in general.18 The
exceptional nature of the industry-wide approach illustrates challenges faced
by the great majority of FE workers who, like the great majority of workers
nationally, lack union representation that can help them secure such
protections.
At the same time, the COVID-19 crisis presents an opportunity for some
basic rethinking of how the law regulates workplace safety and health. To
start, federal law must address safety and health protections more
substantially in industry-wide terms. Rather than relegating millions of FE
workers to the piecemeal responses described below, this Article contends
that safety and health regulation needs to develop on an occupational or
sectoral basis to complement existing firm-specific approaches. Further,
safety and health protests driven by unusually hazardous conditions such as
COVID-19 deserve meaningful protection that the law does not currently
provide. To that end, federal law regulating the scope and consequences of
lawful strikes must be reformed.

13. See infra Section II.A.
14. See infra Sections II.B–C.
15. See infra Sections II.A–D.
16. See infra Section II.F.
17. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116–
136, tit. IV, §§ 4114–4120, 134 Stat. 281 (2020).
18. For detailed discussion of the industry-wide airline provisions of the CARES Act, as
contrasted with the employer-specific unemployment insurance approach characteristic of
U.S. responses, see infra Section II.F.
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Part I of this Article explores the composition of the FE workforce,
including its demographics and income levels, union status, and extent of
COVID-19 exposure. Part II addresses in detail the state of legal protection
for FE workers, assessing inadequacies in the laws as written and
implemented. Part III reflects on the two aspects of legislative change just
mentioned, explaining how they can help address the safety and health
deficits FE workers (and millions of others) have confronted during the
pandemic.19
The impact of COVID-19 vividly demonstrates that the nature and extent
of health risks vary with the working conditions experienced in different
industries and occupation groups. For FE workers whose lives and health
are most at risk, a comparable sectoral or industry-wide framework must play
a key part in legislative and regulatory responses. Possible models for such
a sectoral approach exist — in tripartite arrangements on wages that have
featured federal and state government participation, and in past and present
industry-wide collective bargaining agreements.20
COVID-19 also has shown how grave workplace hazards can arise with
little or no warning and persist or worsen if unaddressed. Yet our conception
of protected forms of worker protest against such hazards has withered over
decades of adverse court and agency rulings.21 Labor law currently provides
limited protection for peaceful grievance-related strikes motivated by health
and safety concerns, or for health and safety refusals to work in abnormally
dangerous conditions. These minimal protections should be extended: by
expanding the definition of strikes to cover intermittent or repeated
safety-related walkouts and slowdowns, with or without a union presence,
and by prohibiting permanent replacements for all such protest actions.22
Finally, this Article refers briefly to the unresolved challenges of
immigration law reform — for FE workers in various occupational sectors
where non-citizens are vital to performance, it is well past time for legislative
or regulatory action.

19. Reflection occurs at a time when a major labor law reform bill has passed the House
of Representatives but has little prospect of success in the Senate during the current Congress;
the bill’s provisions do not address workplace safety and health generally or the pandemic in
particular. See Protecting the Right to Organize Act of 2019, H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. (2020);
Eli Rosenberg, House Passes Bill to Rewrite Labor Laws and Strengthen Unions, WASH. POST
(Feb.
6,
2020,
9:21
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/02/06/house-passes-bill-rewrite-labor-laws
-strengthen-unions/ [https://perma.cc/2K53-TGHX].
20. See infra Section III.A.
21. See Walmart Stores, Inc., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (July 25, 2019); Elk Lumber Co., 91
N.L.R.B. 333 (1950); Int’l Union, UAW. Am. v. Wis. Emp. Rels. Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949);
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
22. See infra Section III.B.
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I. THE COVID-19 FRONTLINE ESSENTIAL WORKFORCE
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) March 19
Advisory Memorandum listed a vast range of “operations and services that
are typically essential to continued critical infrastructure viability.”23 But
the federal government has not drawn a distinction between essential
occupations where operations and services can be performed largely or
exclusively from home, and frontline essential occupations where workers
must provide their labor in person. That distinction has emerged at the state
and local government level, and through analyses conducted by researchers.
Moreover, the six industry categories relied on here24 do not address variance
among specific occupations. For instance, the grocery, convenience, and
drug store category does not distinguish backroom workers, shelf stockers,
and cashiers. Nonetheless, the six categories, ranging from 800,000 workers
(public transit) to 16 million (healthcare providers and support personnel, of
whom college-educated professionals are an overall minority), reveal
considerable information about the nature of those who perform frontline
work.
A. Demographics
Racial trends among the six categories are perhaps the most revealing.
For each of the six, the proportion of Black workers is higher than that of the
national average, and for all FE workers combined, it is more than 40%
higher.25 For trucking, warehouse, and postal workers; healthcare workers;
and childcare and social service workers, the proportion who are Black is
substantially higher than the national average for all workers — among
public transit workers and in meatpacking, it is more than double the national
average.26

23. See Advisory Memorandum, supra note 3. The Advisory Memorandum has been
updated several times since it was released in March 2020.
24. The categories are grocery, convenience, and drug stores; public transit; trucking,
warehouse, and postal service; building cleaning services; healthcare; and childcare and social
services. See CEPR REPORT, supra note 9, at 5–6; NYC FRONTLINE WORKERS, supra note 9,
at 2. The healthcare and social service worker components are focused on non-government
employees providing services. See NYC FRONTLINE WORKERS, supra note 9, at 8.
25. See CEPR REPORT, supra note 9, at 7 tbl.1 (finding 17.0% of FE workers are Black
whereas the national average is 11.9%). In New York City, the proportion of FE workers who
are Black is even higher — more than double the national average for the entire workforce.
See NYC FRONTLINE WORKERS, supra note 9.
26. The national average is 18.2% for trucking, warehouse, and postal service; 17.5% for
healthcare; 19.3% for childcare and social services; 26.0% for public transit; and 25.2% for
meatpacking. CEPR REPORT, supra note 9, at 7 tbl.1; see also Shawn Fremstad, Hye Jin Rho
& Hayley Brown, Meatpacking Workers Are a Diverse Group Who Need Better Protections,
CTR.
FOR
ECON.
&
POL’Y
RSCH.
(Apr.
29,
2020),
https://cepr.net/meatpacking-workers-are-a-diverse-group-who-need-better-protections/#:~:t
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The share of Latinx workers in grocery, convenience, and drug stores; in
trucking, warehouses, and postal service; and in childcare and social services
exceeds the national average. That share is more than double the national
average among building cleaning services workers,27 as is the proportion of
foreign-born workers in building cleaning services.28 Immigrants are
significantly overrepresented in other essential occupations: over half of
frontline meatpacking workers are immigrants, as are more than one-fourth
of home health aides.29 Additional studies of FE workers use somewhat
different datasets and reach similar conclusions: these workers are
disproportionately Black, Latinx, and foreign born,30 for some occupations
strikingly so.31

ext=Immigrants%20are%20particularly%20overrepresented%20in,frontline%20meatpackin
g%20workers%20are%20immigrants [https://perma.cc/M2M4-KL6U].
27. See CEPR REPORT, supra note 9. The national average is 16.8%; it is 18.0% for
childcare and social services; 18.5% for grocery, convenience, and drug stores; 20.0% for
trucking, warehouse, and postal service; and 40.2% for building cleaning services. Id. at 7
tbl.1. In New York City, the proportion of FE workers who are Latinx is again, considerably
higher than the average for all workers, including 60% of cleaning workers. Overall, 75% of
New York City’s FE workers are individuals of color, compared with 41.2% of FE workers
across the country. NYC FRONTLINE WORKERS, supra note 9.
28. See CEPR REPORT, supra note 9, at 7 tbl.1 (finding 38.2% of building cleaning
services workers are foreign born whereas the national average of all workers is 17.1%).
29. See CEPR REPORT, supra note 9 (home health aides); Fremstad et al., supra note 26
(meatpacking workers).
30. See MIKE NICHOLSON & DANIELA ALULEMA, CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUD. OF N.Y.,
IMMIGRANTS COMPRISE 31 PERCENT OF WORKERS IN NEW YORK STATE ESSENTIAL BUSINESSES
AND 70 PERCENT OF THE STATE’S UNDOCUMENTED LABOR FORCE WORKS IN ESSENTIAL
BUSINESSES
(2020),
https://cmsny.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Printable-New-York-Essential-Workers-Rep
ort.pdf [https://perma.cc/CNR3-2LEK]; Julia Gelatt, Immigrant Workers: Vital to the U.S.
COVID-19 Response, Disproportionately Vulnerable, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Apr. 2020),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigrant-workers-us-covid-19-response
[https://perma.cc/5EG8-63GW]; Audrey Kearney & Cailey Muñana, Taking Stock of
Essential
Workers,
KFF
(May
1,
2020),
https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-policy-watch/taking-stock-of-essential-workers/
[https://perma.cc/EMZ9-LNB7]; Celine McNicholas & Margaret Poydock, Who Are
Essential Workers?, ECON. POL’Y INST.: WORKING ECON. BLOG (May 19, 2020, 11:25 AM),
https://www.epi.org/blog/who-are-essential-workers-a-comprehensive-look-at-their-wages-d
emographics-and-unionization-rates/ [https://perma.cc/3Z4M-LP8W]; Tomer & Kane, supra
note 10.
31. See, e.g., NICHOLSON & ALULEMA, supra note 30 (immigrants comprise 31% of
workers in New York State essential businesses, and 70% of New York’s undocumented labor
force are essential workers); Gelatt, supra note 30 (immigrants are substantially
overrepresented as pharmacists, butchers and meat processors, and workers in manufacturing
of food, medicines, and soap/cleaning agents); Kearney & Muñana, supra note 30 (FE
workers are three times more likely to be Black than other essential workers); Tomer & Kane,
supra note 10 (Black and Hispanic/Latino workers are overrepresented as industrial truck
operators, slaughterers and meatpackers, nursing assistants, and correctional officers).
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Data regarding the sex of FE workers are also revealing. In four of the six
categories, more than half the workers are female, compared to 48% of the
workforce as a whole. More than three-quarters in healthcare, and also
childcare and social services, are women. Overall, 64% of FE workers are
female.32
FE workers are more likely than the workforce as a whole to be
compensated at below 200% of the federal poverty line, a measure
recognized to reflect low-income employment.33 Workers in three
categories — grocery, convenience, and drug stores; building cleaning
services; and childcare and social services — are substantially more likely
to live in households below twice the poverty line.34 Relatedly, FE workers
report more difficulty meeting necessary expenses such as food, utilities, and
credit card bills during the pandemic,35 prompting proposals for hazard pay
for those workers.36 Lower levels of education often accompany lower
income — that is the case here as well. FE workers are likelier to have a
high school degree at most when compared with the workforce as a whole,
and less likely to have a four-year college or post-graduate degree.37
B. Union Representation
The overwhelming majority of FE workers lack union representation, as
is true for private-sector workers in general. Although data on union
representation from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) do not align
32. See CEPR REPORT, supra note 9, at 8 tbl.2. In public transit and trucking, warehouse,
and postal service, women comprise less than 30% of the workforce. The breakdowns by sex
are comparable to New York City’s. See NYC FRONTLINE WORKERS, supra note 9. For an
analysis of how the COVID-19 crisis has exacerbated existing racial and gender inequalities,
in particular for women of color, see Catherine Powell, Color of Covid and Gender of Covid:
Essential Workers, Not Disposable People, 32 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM (forthcoming 2021).
33. See CEPR REPORT, supra note 9, at 4. The 2020 federal poverty income level for a
family of four is $26,200. See Federal Poverty Level (FPL), HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/federal-poverty-level-fpl/
[https://perma.cc/X9HQ-CXV7] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020). For recognition that twice this
official level is a broadly accepted metric for low-wage employment and living circumstances,
see Heather Koball & Yang Jiang, Basic Facts About Low-Income Children, NAT’L CTR. FOR
CHILD.
POVERTY
(Jan.
2018),
http://www.nccp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/text_1194.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PPM5-LKNU].
34. See CEPR REPORT, supra note 9, at 7 tbl.1 (finding 20.6% for all workers versus 30%
for childcare and social services; 30.1% for grocery, convenience, and drug store; and 42.4%
for building cleaning services). In New York City, the proportions for these three groups are
comparable or higher: 34%, 35%, and 39%, respectively. NYC FRONTLINE WORKERS, supra
note 9.
35. See Kearney & Muñana, supra note 30, at 3.
36. See infra Section II.D.
37. See CEPR REPORT, supra note 9, at 7 tbl.1; Blau et al., supra note 6, at 5–6; Tomer &
Kane, supra note 10, at 11.
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directly with the FE worker categories discussed here, some categories are
comparable. Private-sector union representation, which overall constitutes
7.1% of that workforce, ranges from 4.7% for retail trade workers to 8.3%
for healthcare support workers, 9.7% for building and grounds cleaners, and
13.7% for healthcare practitioners.38 Although these levels of union
representation are quite modest, represented workers receive higher
compensation — 4.4% to 22% higher, depending on the category.39
Apart from advantages in compensation, union workers enjoy more safety
and health benefits and protections than their non-union counterparts. In
relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, these protections include greater access
to paid sick days, likelier coverage under employer-provided health
insurance, collectively bargained requirements for safety and health
equipment, and the ability to report unsafe working conditions without
retaliation.40 To take one example, the United Food and Commercial
Workers (UFCW) represents workers at grocery stores and meat processing
plants across the country. The union has negotiated for premium pay, paid
sick leave, and PPE for tens of thousands of workers since the pandemic
began.41 These and other safety and health protections are especially
important for FE workers, who bear a disproportionate risk of COVID-19
infection.
C. Risks of Infection
Inevitably, there will be widespread infection, hospitalization, and death
in the midst of a pandemic. Healthcare professionals bear the highest
exposure risks in the workforce, and the death toll for these workers

38. Table 3: Union Affiliation of Employed Wage and Salary Workers by Occupation and
Industry,
U.S.
BUREAU
LAB.
STAT.
(Jan.
22,
2020),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm [https://perma.cc/Y5KM-RLBA]. By
contrast, local government employees have 39% union representation nationally, and public
transit workers are among those benefiting substantially from such representation. See id.
39. Compensation is 4.4% higher in retail trades, 9.4% for healthcare practitioners, 16%
for healthcare support workers, and 22% for building and grounds cleaners. Table 4: Median
Weekly Earnings of Full-time Wage and Salary Workers by Union Affiliation, Occupation,
and
Industry,
U.S.
BUREAU
LAB.
STAT.
(Jan.
22,
2020),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t04.htm [https://perma.cc/99SG-PA5Y].
40. See McNicholas & Poydock, supra note 30, at 5 (discussing these advantages in some
detail).
41. See id. See generally Press Release, United Food & Com. Workers Int’l Union,
Unions Representing Health Care Professionals Call on CDC to Reconsider Protections
During Coronavirus Outbreak (Mar. 6, 2020), http://www.ufcw.org/coronavirus/
[https://perma.cc/46YR-ZDTD] (calling on the CDC to strengthen protections for first
responders fighting the coronavirus outbreak). For a fuller discussion of protections secured
through union representation and collective bargaining, see infra Section II.F.
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continues to rise.42 Non-healthcare frontline occupations such as bus drivers
and other transit workers, childcare and social service workers, cashiers, and
food preparation workers are also ranked as higher risk,43 and these workers
are more often exposed without adequate training, PPE, or social distancing
requirements. As these occupations are disproportionately non-white, it is
unsurprising that the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reports rates of
hospitalization and death significantly higher among the Black and Latinx
populations than among whites.44 The higher rates of morbidity and
mortality also reflect the impact of factors besides job-related exposures,
including substandard housing conditions and inequities in healthcare
insurance and services.45
With respect to infection data for specific occupations, underreporting of
confirmed cases and deaths is widespread. Among healthcare providers,
mild or asymptomatic infections are less likely to be tested and less likely to
be reported.46 Among meatpacking plants, the true infection rate is
“anyone’s guess” because many plants and even state and local health
officials refuse to provide the number of illnesses.47 A similar problem exists
with the grocery store industry, where employees may not report from fear
of retaliation, and employers do not provide data, citing concerns about the

42. See Lost on the Frontline, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 28, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2020/aug/11/lost-on-the-frontline-covi
d-19-coronavirus-us-healthcare-workers-deaths-database [https://perma.cc/HK2A-YZSC].
43. See Marcus Lu, The Front Line: Visualizing the Occupations with the Highest
COVID-19
Risk,
VISUAL
CAPITALIST
(Apr.
15,
2020),
https://www.visualcapitalist.com/the-front-line-visualizing-the-occupations-with-the-highest
-covid-19-risk/ [https://perma.cc/93BK-WKZW]; see also OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., GUIDANCE ON PREPARING WORKPLACES FOR COVID-19, at 18–
20 (2020) [hereinafter GUIDANCE ON PREPARING WORKPLACES FOR COVID-19],
https://www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA3990.pdf [https://perma.cc/6U6U-Y75Y].
44. See COVIDView: A Weekly Surveillance Summary of U.S. COVID-19 Activity, CTRS.
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covidview/index.html
[https://perma.cc/GY8W-XNYW] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020) (reporting hospitalization rates
by race and ethnicity, March 1 to October 31, 2020).
45. See Health Equity Considerations and Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION
(July
24,
2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/racial-ethnic-minorities
.html [https://perma.cc/Z5FQ-D2K6].
46. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Characteristics of Health Care Personnel
with COVID-19 — United States, February 12–April 9, 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 477, 479 (2020).
47. See Michael Corkery et al., As Meatpacking Plants Reopen, Data About Worker
Illness
Remains
Elusive,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
25,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/25/business/coronavirus-meatpacking-plants-cases.html
[https://perma.cc/KE9Y-5KBL].
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health, safety, and privacy of their workers.48 Notwithstanding these
reporting inadequacies, partial data collected on meatpackers, grocery
workers, healthcare personnel, and transit workers as of late August 2020
reveal over 200,000 positive tests and more than a thousand deaths.49
One striking indicator in the meatpacking industry has been infection rates
for rural counties with meatpacking plant outbreaks. The average infection
rate in late May in these counties was almost 1,100 per 100,000 — more than
five times the average rate of rural counties without meatpacking plants.50
In late May 2020, six of the ten U.S. counties with the highest infection rates
were home to meatpacking plants suffering from outbreaks — rates range
from 4,190 to 7,865 per 100,000.51 As a point of comparison, the infection
rate in New York City during that time was 2,512 per 100,000.52

48. See Nicole Dungca et al., On the Front Lines of the Pandemic, Grocery Workers Are
in the Dark About Risks, WASH. POST (May 27, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2020/05/24/grocery-workers-coronavirus-ri
sks/ [https://perma.cc/YY3V-6CMB].
49. For meatpackers, see Sky Chadde, Tracking Covid-19’s Impact on Meatpacking
Workers
and
Industry,
MIDWEST CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING,
https://investigatemidwest.org/2020/04/16/tracking-covid-19s-impact-on-meatpacking-work
ers-and-industry/ [https://perma.cc/BD4M-N2M2] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020) (reporting at
least 41,000 positive cases and 214 deaths as of October 30, 2020). For grocery store workers,
see Abha Bhattarai, Grocery Workers Say Morale Is at an All-Time Low: ‘They Don’t Even
Treat
Us
Like
Humans
Anymore,’
WASH. POST
(Aug.
12,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/08/12/grocery-workers-coronavirus/
[https://perma.cc/4M9G-M576] (reporting, as of August 12, 2020, at least 8,200 positive
cases and 130 deaths). For healthcare providers, see Cases & Deaths Among Healthcare
Personnel,
CTRS.
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/?CDC_AA_refVal=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cdc.g
ov%2Fcoronavirus%2F2019-ncov%2Fcases-updates%2Fcases-in-us.html#health-care-perso
nnel (last visited Nov. 2, 2020) (reporting at least 201,992 positive cases and 786 deaths as of
November 2, 2020). For transit workers, see Jose Martinez, NYC Subway Crews Hit Hardest
by Coronavirus, MTA Numbers Show, CITY (June 1, 2020, 5:05 PM),
https://www.thecity.nyc/2020/6/1/21277407/nyc-subway-crews-hit-hardest-by-coronaviruspandemic-mta-numbers-show [https://perma.cc/L6MV-KE56] (addressing New York City
alone; updated to August 27, 2020, reporting at least 9,500 positive cases and 127 deaths).
50. See Leah Douglas & Tim Marema, When COVID-19 Hits a Rural Meatpacking Plant,
County Infection Rates Soar to Five Times the Average, FOOD & ENV’T REPORTING NETWORK
(May
28,
2020),
https://thefern.org/2020/05/when-covid-19-hits-a-rural-meatpacking-plant-county-infectionrates-soar-to-five-times-the-average/ [https://perma.cc/HE8Y-5PMJ].
51. Id.
52. John Elflein, Rates of Coronavirus (COVID-19) in the United States in the Most
Impacted Counties as of June 9, 2020, STATISTICA (Aug. 24, 2020),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1109053/coronavirus-covid19-cases-rates-us-americansmost-impacted-counties/ [https://perma.cc/HC2B-W5V8].
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II. INADEQUATE PROTECTIONS FOR FRONTLINE ESSENTIAL WORKERS
Government efforts to protect health and safety during the COVID-19
outbreak have addressed the general population as well as the workforce.
Measures aimed at the workforce as a whole fall into preventive,
ameliorative, and compensatory categories, and these measures have
enhanced protections available to FE workers as well. At the same time, the
patchwork changes in federal and state law have been uneven, inconsistent,
and seriously inadequate. Taken as a whole, the fragmented responses are
unworthy of the “heroes” rhetoric attached to these workers. FE workers,
recognizing this irony, have pointed to the inadequate protections
accompanying their “heroes” label.53
A. Paid Leave
The Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA)54 creates two new
kinds of paid leave for employers with fewer than 500 employees, both of
which terminate December 31, 2020.55 The Act mandates paid family and
medical leave for employees unable to work because they are caring for their
children.56 It further requires employers to provide up to 80 hours of
emergency paid sick leave for a range of reasons related to COVID-19.57
Both provisions are enforced through existing labor law statutes, including
private rights of action.58

53. See, e.g., Karleigh Frisbie Brogan, Calling Me a Hero Only Makes You Feel Better,
ATLANTIC
(Apr.
18,
2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/i-work-grocery-store-dont-call-me-hero/
610147/ [https://perma.cc/8RT9-SQUT]; Hanna Wallis, Nurses Say They Don’t Want to Be
Called Heroes During the Coronavirus Pandemic, TEEN VOGUE (Apr. 28, 2020),
https://www.teenvogue.com/story/nurses-dont-want-to-be-called-heroes
[https://perma.cc/664Q-TAS2]. See generally Bhattarai, supra note 49 (discussing the
difficult work conditions of FE workers).
54. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, § 1, 134 Stat. 178
(2020).
55. See id. § 3102.
56. See id. FFCRA, Division C, amends Title I of the Family and Medical Leave Act,
providing up to 12 weeks leave, the first two unpaid and thereafter paid at no less than
two-thirds the employee’s regular pay. See id.
57. See id. § 5102(a)–(b). The paid sick leave is in addition to any benefits that employees
already accrue, including FFCRA’s paid family and medical leave. See id. § 3102. Employers
are not required to provide either form of leave to employees who are healthcare providers or
emergency responders. See id.
58. Enforcement of the family and medical leave requirements is through existing Family
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) provisions, which authorize private suits against employers
covered by the FMLA. See id. § 5105(a). Enforcement of paid sick leave protections is
through the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA): an employer who fails to provide this leave is
considered to have failed to pay minimum wages. See id.
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Although these new federal mandates furnish important temporary
protections for millions of workers, their coverage restriction to employers
with fewer than 500 employees excludes nearly half of the private-sector
workforce.59 The justification for the large-employer exclusion was that
most such companies already offer paid sick days and leave, and thus do not
need the federal tax subsidies contained in FFCRA. The reality, however, is
that these employers very often provide either no paid sick leave or fewer
than ten days; they also generally provide extended family leave only for
parents with a new child.60
In addition, DOL has issued guidance that restricts or undermines the
statutory protections in several meaningful ways.61 Further, while the
legislation authorized DOL to issue regulations “for good cause” to exempt
small businesses with fewer than 50 employees in limited circumstances,
DOL’s temporary rules effectively invite all small businesses to declare

59. According to the BLS, 47.6% or approximately 59 million individuals worked for
private-sector employers that employ more than 500 employees in 2019. See Table F:
Distribution of Private Sector Employment by Firm Size Class: 1993/Q1 Through 2019/Q1,
Not
Seasonally
Adjusted,
BUREAU LAB. STAT. [hereinafter
Table
F],
https://www.bls.gov/web/cewbd/table_f.txt [https://perma.cc/GR2S-GQ98] (last visited Aug.
31, 2020).
60. See Steven Findlay, Congress Left Big Gaps in the Paid Sick Days and Paid Leave
Provisions of the Coronavirus Emergency Legislation, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Apr. 29, 2020),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200424.223002/full/
[https://perma.cc/84AD-3EJR]; see also Michelle Long & Mathew Rae, Gaps in the
Emergency Paid Sick Leave Law for Health Care Workers, KFF (June 17, 2020),
https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/gaps-in-emergency-paid-sick-leave-la
w-for-health-care-workers/ [https://perma.cc/R44U-GT8E] (discussing exclusion of
healthcare workers identified supra note 57, as well as exclusion of large private employers).
61. These limitations include (i) creating a substantially overbroad application of the
“healthcare provider” exemption from paid sick and family leave, contrary to the Act’s
definition; (ii) reducing access to leave for those days when the employer does not assign
them work, furloughs them, or closes a particular worksite; and (iii) defining leave access at
full-day increments although the statute refers to “paid sick time,” which allows for
intermittent leave. See Letter from Sen. Patty Murray & Rep. Rosa DeLauro to Eugene Scalia,
Sec’y of Lab., U.S. Dep’t of Lab. (Apr. 1, 2020) (explaining their concerns at length and
referencing specific provisions in FFCRA and DOL Guidelines). A federal district court
subsequently voided limitations dealing with the scope of the healthcare provider exemption
and with reduced access to sick leave when no work is available. See Jonathan Stempel, Judge
Rejects Trump Restrictions on Coronavirus Sick Leave for Employees, REUTERS (Aug. 3,
2020,
11:08
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-new-york-lawsuit/judge-rejects-trum
p-restrictions-on-coronavirus-sick-leave-for-employees-idUSKCN24Z1Y6
[https://perma.cc/6885-3GBR]; see also Chris Lu et al., Why Americans Don’t Know About
Their Right to Paid Sick Leave, NEWSWEEK (May 4, 2020, 9:00 AM),
https://www.newsweek.com/why-americans-dont-know-about-their-right-paid-sick-leave-op
inion-1501532 [https://perma.cc/K3EP-C8QV] (addressing these problems and also failure to
publicize availability of the paid leave even though Congress allocated $15 million to DOL
to do so).
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themselves exempted, with no requirement for agency review or even
employer documentation of reasons.62 Given that 34 million employees
work for small businesses, the effect of this added exemption is to leave
roughly three-quarters of the private-sector workforce uncovered by the paid
leave requirements.63 Excluding employers with fewer than 50 employees
particularly impacts certain occupations; nearly two-thirds of agricultural
workers, for instance, are hired by these smaller employers.64
Some state and local governments have come forward to try and fill in the
sizable gaps regarding paid leave. A California Executive Order requires
that paid sick and family leave be provided for food sector workers anywhere
in the food supply chain, working for companies that employ 500 or more
nationwide.65 New York, New Jersey, Michigan, and Colorado, among other
states, have extended paid sick leave and family and medical leave to
employees not limited to a particular occupation or industry.66 Some of these
states have targeted protection to workers in small business settings with
fewer than 50 employees.67
In addition, local governments have

62. See Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, § 5111, 134 Stat.
178 (2020) (authorizing regulations to exempt small businesses “for good cause”); id. §
5111(2) (authorizing exemption of employers with fewer than 50 employees “when the
imposition of [leave] requirements would jeopardize the viability of the business as a going
concern”); 29 C.F.R. § 826.40(b) (2020) (allowing exemption if eligible employees’ absence
would cause small business expenses and obligations to exceed business revenue, would pose
a substantial risk to financial health or operational capacity, or would prevent business from
operating at minimum capacity. Although small businesses must document and retain records
justifying denial of leave in connection with unavailability of childcare, no such requirement
exists for denial of paid leave for other reasons).
63. According to BLS, 34 million individuals, or approximately 27.4% of the active
workforce, worked for employers with fewer than 50 employees in 2019. Table F, supra note
59.
64. See
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
AGRIC.,
FARM
LABOR
22
(2019),
https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-esmis/files/x920fw89s/c821h164m/fq97889
43/fmla1119.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7NB-E3RV]. See generally Daniel Costa & Philip
Martin, Nine in 10 Farmworkers Could Be Covered by the Paid Leave Provisions of the
Families First Coronavirus Response Act — but Not If Smaller Employers Are Exempted,
ECON. POLICY INST.: WORKING ECONS. BLOG (Mar. 31, 2020, 2:59 PM),
https://www.epi.org/blog/9-in-10-farmworkers-could-be-covered-by-the-paid-leave-provisio
ns-of-the-families-first-coronavirus-response-act-but-not-if-smaller-employers-are-exempte
d/ [https://perma.cc/ATF7-GXWH].
65. See Cal. Exec. Order No. 51-20 (Apr. 16, 2020).
66. See Colorado Health Emergency Leave with Pay (Colorado Help) Rules, COLO. CODE
REGS. § 1103-10 (2020); New Jersey Earned Sick Leave, 2020 N.J. Laws Ch. 17 (codified as
amended at N.J. STAT. § C.34:11D-3); New Jersey Expanded Family Leave Law, 2020 N.J.
Laws Ch. 23 (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. § C.34:11B-3); New York Paid Sick Leave
Law, 2020 N.Y. Sess. Laws Ch. 25, § 8091 (McKinney 2020); Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020-36
(Apr. 3, 2020), [hereinafter Michigan Executive Order].
67. N.Y. Sick Leave Law requires: (i) employers with ten or fewer employees provide
unpaid quarantine leave, and (ii) employers with fewer than ten employees and net income
greater than $1 million, or employing between 11 and 99 employees, provide at least five days
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promulgated their own paid leave ordinances. In California localities, such
ordinances vary by the size of employers covered, and some are silent with
regard to specific aspects, including job restoration, intermittent use of leave,
employer obligation to post notice, and availability of an enforcement action
for damages and attorney’s fees.68 These variations at state and local levels
indicate a broad-based interest in innovative solutions. At the same time, the
unevenness in coverage and protections also reflects gaps left by the absence
of a comprehensive federal approach.
Related to sick leave, workers’ families and representatives have begun
filing wrongful death lawsuits in state courts. Thus far, a number of these
suits have been on behalf of deceased individuals who worked in meat
processing and chain store occupations.69 An additional and important
development in a number of states is the action taken to extend workers’
compensation coverage to COVID-19 infections by reversing the usual
presumption that diseases of ordinary life are not covered. The most
common approach is to make COVID-19 infections presumptively
work-related for healthcare workers and first responders.70 Some states have

of paid quarantine leave, and the remainder unpaid. See N.Y. Sick Leave Law § 1.1(a). N.J.
Family Leave Law applies to employers with at least 30 employees, N.J. Stat. §
34:11B-3(f)(4), while N.J. Earned Sick Leave Law applies to all employers, regardless of size.
See N.J. Stat. § 34:11D-2(a). Michigan Executive Order, supra note 66, at 7(b), mandates that
employers, including ones with fewer than 50 employees, provide paid medical leave.
68. See L.A. COUNTY, CAL., ORDINANCE CH. 8.200.010 (2020); OAKLAND, CAL.,
OAKLAND MUNICIPAL CODE CH. 5.94 (2020); SAN JOSE, CAL., URGENCY ORDINANCE NO.
30390 (2020); L.A., Cal., Public Order — Supplemental Paid Sick Leave Due to COVID-19
(Apr. 7, 2020); S.F., Cal., Public Health Emergency Leave Ordinance Implementation
Guidance (Apr. 17, 2020).
69. See, e.g., Complaint at 2, Zuniga v. Safeway Inc., No. RG50063313 (Cal. Super. Ct.
June 3, 2020); Complaint ¶ 3.1, Lay v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2020 WL 2511326 (N.D. Tex. May
15, 2020) (No. 2:20-cv-00125-Z); Complaint at 3, Benjamin v. JBS S.A., No. 200500370
(Phila. Cty. Ct. Com. Pl. May 7, 2020); Complaint § V, Parra v. Quality Sausage Co., No.
DC-20-06406 (Dall. Cty. Jud. Dist. Ct. May 1, 2020); Complaint at 2, Evans v. Walmart Inc.,
No. 2020L003938 (Cook Cty. Cir. Ct. Apr. 6, 2020) (removed to S.D. Ala. on May, 27, 2020);
see also Harris Meyer, Coronavirus-Related Deaths in Nursing Homes Prompt Lawsuits and
Questions About Who’s Responsible, ABA J. (Oct. 1, 2020, 4:00 AM),
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/coronavirus-related-deaths-in-nursing-homesseed-lawsuits-and-questions-about-whos-responsible
[https://perma.cc/DJ3P-L6PH]
(reporting 55 wrongful death lawsuits filed against long-term care facilities as of early
September).
70. See, e.g., S.B. 241, 31st Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2020) (May 18, 2020); N.D. Exec.
Order No. 2020-12 (Mar. 25, 2020); Press Release, Jay Inslee, Wash. Governor, Inslee
Announces Workers’ Compensation Coverage to Include Quarantined Health Workers/First
Responders
(Mar.
5,
2020),
https://www.governor.wa.gov/news-media/inslee-announces-workers-compensation-covera
ge-include-quarantined-health-workersfirst [https://perma.cc/3JV2-ECEB].
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gone further, extending the presumption of coverage to grocery workers, all
essential workers, or even all workers.71
The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act,
passed in March 2020, was the second major federal law affecting workers.72
The law’s central feature is an economic stimulus package of unprecedented
size and scope that includes substantial federal unemployment compensation
benefits on top of the existing state benefits system.73 The CARES Act
includes other provisions related to workers’ well-being, such as financial
support for healthcare industries and tax credits or deferrals for employers.74
Additional sections of the Act support workers in the heavily unionized air
carrier industry;75 those sections are examined in Section II.F.
B. PPE and Social Distancing Requirements
The FFCRA does not address safety and health protections for employers
to furnish at individual workplaces. These protections may be provided ad
hoc on an individual workplace basis, but employers and industries also are
in a position to develop and implement workplace infection control plans
specific to each type of workplace and its level of COVID-19 exposure.
Hospitals, grocery stores, and meat processing plants carry higher and more
diverse risks than accounting offices or law firms, warranting different
approaches to their respective working conditions and environments. In
principle, employer plans should cover a range of factors such as exposure
and risk assessment, the need for PPE and other job condition adjustments,

71. See H.B. 2455, 101st Leg. (Ill. 2020) (enacted June 5, 2020) (extending to all essential
workers); Cal. Exec. Order No. 62-20 (May 6, 2020) (extending to all workers otherwise
covered under workers compensation); Ky. Exec. Order No. 2020-277 (Apr. 9, 2020)
(extending the presumption to grocery store workers and also postal workers and childcare
workers).
72. Congress enacted a third statute in March to stimulate coronavirus vaccine research
and development. See Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 116-123, 134 Stat. 146 (2020).
73. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No.
116-136, § 2104(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2020) (adding an additional $600 per week for employees
receiving unemployment compensation under state law); id. § 2107(b)(2) (providing an
additional 13 weeks of unemployment compensation benefits than otherwise provided under
state law); id. § 2102(a)(3)(A) (broadening provision of unemployment benefits to include
self-employed, contract, and gig economy workers who would not have otherwise qualified
for the new federal aid as long as they self-certify that they are unemployed or unable to work
because of listed pandemic-related reasons).
74. See § 3211 (providing supplemental appropriations for health centers to aid
prevention, detection, and treatment of COVID-19); id. § 2302 (allowing employers to defer
the deposit and payment of their portion of Social Security taxes). This Article does not
discuss these provisions inasmuch as they do not directly address health and safety
protections.
75. See id. §§ 4111–4116.
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medical removal and wage protection for infected or exposed workers,
recording and reporting of infections, training and education of workers, and
anti-retaliation protection for workers who raise safety and health concerns.
Relatedly, CDC has issued periodic detailed guidance for employers
responding to COVID-19, including addressing actions tailored to particular
industries.76 Overall, CDC has addressed a broad range of protective steps,
including undertaking a hazard assessment of the workplace, conducting
daily health checks of workers, encouraging employees to wear cloth face
coverings in the workplace, implementing policies and practices for social
distancing in the workplace, and improving the workplace ventilation
system.77 The logical agency to turn to for implementation of such guidance
as enforceable requirements is the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) within DOL. As discussed in the following Section,
however, OSHA has refused to issue any directive in the form of a
provisional or emergency safety and health standard. Instead, the agency has
offered its own “Guidance on Preparing Workplaces for COVID-19,” while
stating at the outset that this guidance “creates no new legal obligations,”
offers “recommendations [that] are advisory in nature,” and describes a
voluntary set of actions that employers “[c]an take to reduce workers’ risk
of exposure.”78
Facing a lack of federal requirements, a few states again stepped up, often
beginning when the economy began re-opening after stay-at-home orders.
In California, the Department of Industrial Relations specifies that
employers must determine if COVID-19 is a hazard in their workplace as

76. See, e.g., Meat and Poultry Processing Workers and Employers, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION
(July
9,
2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/organizations/meat-poultry-proces
sing-workers-employers.html [https://perma.cc/UNY7-8CKW]; What Grocery and Food
Retail Workers Need to Know About COVID-19, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(Apr.
13,
2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/organizations/grocery-food-retailworkers.html [https://perma.cc/F847-9Y34]; What Mail and Parcel Delivery Drivers Need to
Know About COVID-19, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 17, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/organizations/mail-parcel-drivers.h
tml [https://perma.cc/Z4H9-JUWU]; What Nail Salon Employees Need to Know About
COVID-19, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 23, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/organizations/nail-salon-employee
s.html [https://perma.cc/PMY8-F9M2].
77. COVID-19 Critical Infrastructure Sector Response Planning, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION
(May
6,
2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/critical-infrastructure-sectors.html
[https://perma.cc/H8AV-ACZE] (recommending that employers adopt a multi-pronged
response plan with goals to maintain healthy business operation, reduce transmission, and
maintain healthy work environment).
78. GUIDANCE ON PREPARING WORKPLACES FOR COVID-19, supra note 43, at 1, 7.
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part of the state’s mandated Injury and Illness Prevention Program. If it is a
workplace hazard, employers are required to implement infection control
measures, including applicable recommendations from the CDC.79 Other
states — including Massachusetts, New York, and New Jersey at early stages
and some 35 states by mid-August — mandated the use of masks at all times
by the public as well as workers inside grocery stores, pharmacies, and other
retail establishments.80 Several states, including New York, require
employers to provide PPE to workers at the employers’ expense.81
Without systemic occupationally tailored requirements for PPE, social
distancing, and other workplace safety protections, FE workers have, at
times, acted on their own to try and compel such protections. Workers in
hospitals, meat processing plants, warehouse distribution centers, and fast
food establishments have brought lawsuits seeking injunctions ordering a
range of protective steps.82 Some court actions have resulted in a measure

79. Cal/OSHA Interim General Guidelines on Protecting Workers from COVID-19, ST.
CAL.
DEP’T
INDUS.
RELS.
(May
14,
2020),
https://www.dir.ca.gov/dosh/coronavirus/general-industry.html
[https://perma.cc/AQW5-M6V3].
80. See Mass. Exec. COVID-19 Order No. 31 (May 1, 2020) (requiring that all employers
and customers wear masks inside grocery stores, pharmacies, retail stores, and when using
mass public transit); N.J. Exec. Order No. 122 (Apr. 8, 2020) (requiring that workers and
customers of essential businesses wear face masks); N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.16 (Apr. 12,
2020) (mandating that all employees in contact with the public wear masks); N.Y. Exec. Order
No. 202.34 (May 28, 2020) (allowing any business operator or owner to require any individual
to wear a mask). See generally Allen Kim et al., These Are the States Requiring People to
Wear Masks When Out in Public, CNN (Aug. 17, 2020, 5:20 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/19/us/states-face-mask-coronavirus-trnd/index.html
[https://perma.cc/KE7L-FRRM].
81. See, e.g., Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01 (Apr. 2, 2020) (requiring that critical
infrastructure employers provide personal protective equipment to workers as available); N.J.
Exec. Order No. 122 (Apr. 8, 2020) (ordering that businesses provide, at their expense, face
coverings and gloves for employees when in contact with customers or goods); N.Y. Exec.
Order No. 202.16 (Apr. 12, 2020) (mandating that employees at all essential businesses be
provided with and wear face coverings when in direct contact with the public); R.I. Exec.
Order No. 20-24 (Apr. 14, 2020) (mandating that all businesses provide, at their expense, face
coverings).
82. For hospitals, see N.Y. Nurses Ass’n v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 2020 WL 2097627, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); Complaint at 19, Lange v. 24-Hour Med. Staffing Servs. LLC, No.
30-2020-01140958-CU-OE-CXC (Cal. Super. Ct. May 26, 2020). For meat processing plants,
see Rural Cmty. Workers All. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., No. 5:30-CV-06063-DGK, 2020 WL
2145350, at *2 (W.D. Mo. May 5, 2020); Complaint ¶ A, Ornelas v. Cent. Valley Meat Co.,
No. 1:20-cv-01017-AWI-SKO (E.D. Cal. July 22, 2020), 2020 WL 4249733, at *33. For
warehousing operations, see Memorandum of Law of Defendant at 1, Palmer v. Amazon.com,
No. 1:20-cv-02468-BMC (E.D.N.Y. July 7, 2020), 2020 WL 5236964, at *1. For fast food
restaurants, see generally Complaint, Massey v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 2020-ch-04247 (Ill.
Cir. Ct. May 19, 2020), 2020 WL 2747338, at *16–17; Complaint, Hernandez v. VES
McDonald’s, No. RG20064825 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 16, 2020), 2020 WL 32878054, at *17.
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of success, while others have fallen short.83 The quest for judicially-imposed
remedies is likely to expand in the months ahead. In addition, workers in
both union84 and non-union85 settings have engaged in forms of self-help,
staging walkouts to protest the lack of adequate protections. Unionized
workers also have negotiated to secure PPE, adequate social distancing, and

83. In Massey, the court granted partial injunctive relief, finding that the restaurants’
training on social distancing and ensuring use of masks was deficient. See Angela Childers,
McDonald’s Ordered to Train Workers on Social Distancing, BUS. INS. (June 25, 2020),
https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20200625/NEWS08/912335302
[https://perma.cc/JCQ5-P8T8]. In Hernandez, the court granted a preliminary injunction that
requires defendant to implement and provide adequate training, safe distancing, paid breaks
every 30 minutes for handwashing, and face masks and gloves. See Robert Iafolla,
McDonald’s Workers Win Virus Safeguards in ‘Dog Diaper’ Case (Corrected), BLOOMBERG
L.
(July
10,
2020,
4:28
PM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/mcdonalds-workers-win-virus-safety-ord
er-in-dog-diaper-case [https://perma.cc/R4QJ-W5CD]; see also Court Orders Restaurant
Company to Allow Worker to Wear Face Covering, CISION (May 7, 2020, 7:09 PM),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/court-orders-restaurant-company-to-allow-wor
ker-to-wear-face-covering-301055430.html [https://perma.cc/94BF-G3ZB]. In N.Y. Nurses
Ass’n, 2020 WL 2097627, at *3, the court dismissed the lawsuit on grounds the dispute was
subject to arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement. In Rural Cmty. Workers All.,
2020 WL 2145350, at *12, the court dismissed the motion for preliminary injunction, ruling
that plaintiffs had not demonstrated irreparable harm and dismissed the lawsuit on grounds
the agencies had primary jurisdiction.
84. See, e.g., Chris Brooks, Auto Companies Announce Closure Following Outbreak of
Wildcat
Strikes,
LAB.
NOTES
(Mar.
18,
2020),
https://www.labornotes.org/blogs/2020/03/auto-companies-announce-closure-following-out
break-wildcat-strikes [https://perma.cc/2VKF-UY7Q]; Royce Jones, ‘I’m Not Afraid of No
Virus Because I Know My God Got Me’: Port Authority Bus Drivers Protest for Better
Conditions During Coronavirus Pandemic, CBS PITTSBURGH (Mar. 27, 2020, 5:52 PM),
https://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2020/03/27/port-authority-bus-drivers-protest-for-better-con
ditions/ [https://perma.cc/EU2Y-K8BR]; Michael Paulson, Union Insists Actors Shouldn’t
Work Till Epidemic Is ʻUnder Control,ʼ N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/26/theater/actors-equity-theater-reopening-virus.html?sm
id=em-share [https://perma.cc/3UPH-8ZPB]; Jane Slaughter, Detroit Bus Drivers Win
Protections Against Virus Through Strike, LAB. NOTES (Mar. 18, 2020),
https://www.labornotes.org/blogs/2020/03/detroit-bus-drivers-win-protections-against-virusthrough-strike [https://perma.cc/2QFT-X625]; Lori Valigra, Bath Iron Works Union Asks for
Shipyard Closure After Half of Workers Fail to Show, WGME (Mar. 24, 2020),
https://wgme.com/news/coronavirus/bath-iron-works-union-asks-for-shipyard-closure-afterhalf-of-workers-fail-to-show [https://perma.cc/U4DZ-TZNF].
85. See, e.g., Josh Dzieza, Amazon Warehouse Workers Walk Out in Rising Tide of
COVID-19
Protests,
VERGE
(Mar.
30,
2020,
2:46
PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/30/21199942/amazon-warehouse-coronavirus-covid-new
-york-protest-walkout [https://perma.cc/8DGE-LAGG]; Sarah Hammond, ‘This Is Not a
Playing Matter’: Perdue Plant Employees Walk Out over COVID-19 Concerns, WMAZ
(Mar.
24,
2020,
9:22
AM),
https://www.13wmaz.com/article/news/local/perdue-employees-walk-out-as-coronavirus-co
ncerns-grow/93-7c7bdcbb-f3ec-439b-b541-9070e758b5cb [https://perma.cc/M6J6-A8GH].
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other forms of protection, including additional paid sick leave beyond what
is available under federal statute.86
This patchwork approach to providing workplace protections has yielded
some advances, although worker protests also have been met with retaliatory
discipline.87 Moreover, the absence of an overarching federal presence has
meant that FE workers must fend for themselves, usually on an
employer-specific basis, to reduce their extraordinary safety and health risks.
C. Emergency Standards and Agency Enforcement
The federal agency charged with enforcing workplace health and safety
has failed to rise to the occasion. Under its 1970 originating statute, OSHA
has authority to issue emergency temporary standards (ETS) to protect
employees against “grave danger from exposure to substances or agents
determined to be toxic or physically harmful or from new hazards.”88 An
ETS serves as a proposed permanent standard, subject to an ensuing notice
and comment procedure and operative for no more than six months.89
Between 1971 and 1983, OSHA issued nine ETSs, some of which were met
with resistance from the courts of appeals.90
Between 2009 and 2017, OSHA developed an extensive approach to
infectious disease rulemaking.91 Today, the agency could draw on the
experience of the California Division of Occupational Safety and Health,
applying its pre-existing enforceable standard protecting nurses and other
healthcare workers from emerging infectious diseases.92 The House pressed

86. See infra Section II.F (discussing protections negotiated by United Food &
Commercial Workers (UFCW), American Postal Workers Union (APWU), Communications
Workers of America (CWA), and transit worker unions).
87. See, e.g., Jay Greene, Amazon Fires Two Tech Workers Who Criticized the Company’s
Warehouse Workplace Conditions, WASH. POST (Apr. 14, 2020, 6:59 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/04/13/amazon-workers-fired/
[https://perma.cc/A5LX-RPDU]; Justin Wise, Nurses Union Says Workers Were Suspended
for Refusing to Help Coronavirus Patients Without N95 Masks, HILL (Apr. 16, 2020, 9:02
AM),
https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/493095-nurses-union-says-workers-were-suspended-fo
r-refusing-to-help-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/SLM6-UJXF].
88. 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(1).
89. See id. § 655(c)(3).
90. See SCOTT SZYMENDERA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46288, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (OSHA): EMERGENCY TEMPORARY STANDARDS (ETS) AND
COVID-19, at 22 tbl.A-1 (2020) (listing ETSs).
91. See Letter from Richard Trumka, President, Am. Fed’n of Lab. & Cong. of Indus.
Orgs., to Eugene Scalia, Sec’y of Lab., U.S. Dep’t of Lab. 8 (Mar. 6, 2020).
92. See Letter from Bonnie Castillo, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Nurses United, to Eugene Scalia,
Sec’y of Lab., U.S. Dep’t of Lab. & Loren Sweatt, Principal Deputy Assistant, Occupational
Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Lab. (Mar. 4, 2020).
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OSHA to act through a bill requiring ETS promulgation,93 and the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)
sought to compel ETS issuance through a judicial action for extraordinary
mandamus relief.94 The Republican-controlled Senate stalled the legislative
effort, and a panel of the D.C. Circuit rejected the lawsuit.95
In refusing to issue an ETS, OSHA has relied on CDC guidelines without
making them mandatory, thereby removing the prospect of systemic
enforcement for employer noncompliance. With respect to enforcement,
OSHA stated it would rely on its General Duty Clause to assure adequate
protections in individual instances.96 Yet the agency’s enforcement record
is stunningly inadequate.
Having received more than 6,000
COVID-19-related complaints as of July 7, it had issued exactly one citation:
to a Georgia Nursing Home for failing to report employee hospitalizations
within 24 hours.97 In late September, OSHA even withdrew that citation and

93. The Health & Economic Recovery Omnibus Emergency Solutions Act (HEROES
Act), H.R. 6800, 116th Cong. (as approved by House, May 15, 2020).
94. In re AFL-CIO, No. 19-1158, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
95. The Senate has not voted on the HEROES Act, which would require OSHA to adopt
an emergency standard, “as Majority Leader Mitch McConnell holds out for special legal
protections for businesses that could otherwise be sued for failing to provide safe workplaces.”
The Editorial Board, Why Is OSHA AWOL?, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/21/opinion/coronavirus-osha-work-safety.html
[https://perma.cc/4K7C-V8QH]. The D.C. Court of Appeals in In re AFL-CIO dismissed the
motion for a writ of mandamus in a one-paragraph order, finding the agency “reasonably
determined that an ETS is not necessary at this time.” In re AFL-CIO, No. 20-1158, at 1.
96. See 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1970) (requiring employers to furnish a place of employment
that is “free from recognized hazards that are causing or likely to cause death or serious
physical harm to . . . employees”). DOL Secretary, Eugene Scalia, defended OSHA’s
response to the pandemic and invoked the general duty clause to cite employers, stating that,
the general duty clause is “applicable, and we’ll use it as appropriate.” Bruce Rolfsen, OSHA
Virus Emergency Regulation Not Needed, Labor Chief Says, BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 23, 2020,
5:19
PM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/safety/osha-virus-emergency-regulation-not-needed-labor-c
hief-says [https://perma.cc/7NTE-3AJ8].
97. See Jane Mayer, How Trump Is Helping Tycoons Exploit the Pandemic, NEW YORKER
(July
13,
2020),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/07/20/how-trump-is-helping-tycoons-exploit-th
e-pandemic [https://perma.cc/J5FY-Q2UH]; Bruce Rolfsen, First Virus-Related OSHA
Citation Goes to Georgia Nursing Home, BLOOMBERG L. (May 29, 2020, 4:24 PM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/safety/first-virus-related-osha-citation-goes-to-georgia-nurs
ing-home?context=search&index=3 [https://perma.cc/2ZSB-KPHN]; The Editorial Board,
supra note 95. For one example of workers’ frustration with OSHA, see generally Complaint,
Jane Does v. Scalia, No. 1:02-at-06000-UN (M.D. Pa. July 22, 2020) (alleging that employer
did not provide adequate PPE or social distancing on the line, or inform workers of those who
were sick, and also incentivized sick workers to come to work; that plaintiff repeatedly
contacted OSHA with complaints and demands for action, including filing an imminent
danger complaint; and that OSHA never visited the plant, but responded by phone stating that
it will not treat any complaint regarding COVID-19 as an imminent danger complaint).
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accompanying fine, while making it easier for employers not to report their
workers’ COVID-19-related hospitalizations and deaths.98 It is hard to
overstate the extent of this abdication during the first six months of the
pandemic by the very federal agency charged with protecting the health and
safety of workers.
While OSHA issued a handful of subsequent citations in early September
— to two meatpacking plants and several healthcare facilities — for failure
to protect workers from the coronavirus,99 the limited nature of these
citations, the de minimis remedies, and the belated timing are all
problematic. To take one example, the agency cited Smithfield Foods under
the General Duty Clause for failing to provide a safe workplace at its South
Dakota plant, where nearly 1,300 workers contracted the virus starting in
mid to late March, over 40 were hospitalized, and four have died.100 The

98. See Bruce Rolfsen, OSHA Overhauls Guidance for Reporting Virus Hospitalizations
(1), BLOOMBERG L.: OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (Oct. 1, 2020, 5:01 PM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/safety/osha-again-revises-guidance-for-reporting-virus-hos
pitalizations [https://perma.cc/DHA4-SW2Y]. Employers must now report employee
hospitalization due to COVID-19 within 24 hours of learning both that the employee had been
hospitalized and that the reason for hospitalization was a work-related case of COVID-19. In
reversing its previous requirement that employers report hospitalizations within 24 hours of
when the employee was diagnosed as having the virus, OSHA made it easier for employers
to avoid reporting based on their asserted lack of knowledge that work-related exposure was
a cause. See Sheila Mulrooney Eldred, Healthcare Workers Implore OSHA for More
Oversight
on
COVID-19
Safety,
MEDSCAPE
(Oct.
23,
2020),
https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/939726 [https://perma.cc/PWG3-752C].
99. See Archive of U.S. Dep’t of Labor Press Releases, DEP’T LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases?agency=All&state=All&topic=All&year=all&page
=0 [https://perma.cc/YA6R-9TAK] (last visited Oct. 4, 2020) (listing DOL press releases on
September 10–11, 2020, that report OSHA citations against three healthcare facilities in New
Jersey and Louisiana for violating regulations on PPE and respirators, and two meatpacking
plants in Colorado and South Dakota for General Duty Clause violations; fines assessed range
from $9,639 to $28,070 for the violations). As of mid-October, OSHA issued more citations
to healthcare facilities and nursing homes, principally for violation of regulations on providing
personal protective equipment including particularly establishing and implementing
respiratory protections. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.132, 1910.134. The average assessed fine is
$14,378 per violation. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Occupational Safety & Health
Admin., U.S. Department of Labor’s OSHA Announces $1,222,156 in Coronavirus
Violations (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/national/10162020
[https://perma.cc/YJL4-T639] (OSHA announcement of $1,222,156 in coronavirus violations
for 85 establishments).
100. See Citation and Notification of Penalty from Sheila Stanley, Area Dir., Occupational
Safety & Health Admin., to Smithfield Packaged Meats Corp. 6 (Sept. 8, 2020) [hereinafter
Smithfield Citation] (copy on file with author); Jacob Bunge, U.S. Regulators Fine Pork Giant
Smithfield over Covid-19 Outbreak, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 10, 2020, 6:18 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-regulators-fine-pork-giant-smithfield-over-covid-19-outbr
eak-11599776324 [https://perma.cc/8EJA-4E83]; Jeremy Fugleberg, OSHA Fines Smithfield
Foods $13,494 for Not Protecting South Dakota Workers from COVID-19, Faces Backlash
from Company and Workers, DULUTH NEWS TRIB. (Sept. 10, 2020, 1:00 PM),
https://www.duluthnewstribune.com/newsmd/coronavirus/6655554-OSHA-fines-Smithfield

24

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVIII

agency issued a citation for a single serious violation, almost six months after
the onset of this massive number of infections, and nearly five months after
the plant had closed for an extended period at the urging of state and local
officials.101
The proper unit of prosecution under the General Duty Clause is a
violative hazardous condition rather than each individual employee’s
exposure to the violative condition.102 That said, the single Smithfield
citation identified multiple failures to mitigate exposures to the COVID-19
virus,103 and these failures likely would have justified a series of citations
addressing distinct operations or venues within the company’s eight-story
facility employing 3,700 workers.104 Further, the Smithfield citation does
not discuss the lack of training for the largely immigrant workforce regarding
how to practice social distancing on fast-moving production lines, how to
use face masks or shields, or how to prepare for and understand any testing
procedures to be administered.105 Failure to provide training as required
under a workplace safety standard has been cited as separate violations on a
per-employee basis.106 Thus, instead of assessing a fine of just under
-Foods-13494-for-not-protecting-South-Dakota-workers-from-COVID-19-faces-backlash-fr
om-company-and-workers [https://perma.cc/9URU-KK6C].
101. See Bunge, supra note 100; Fugleberg, supra note 100.
102. See Reich v. Arcadian Corp., 110 F.3d 1192, 1196–97 (5th Cir. 1997).
103. See Smithfield Citation, supra note 100, at 6–7 (discussing eight distinct measures of
proactive social distancing related to different areas in the plant, mandatory employee use of
protective measures, and required employee screenings accompanied by written explanations
in different languages).
104. Large meatpacking plants typically involve operations related to immobilizing,
killing, deboning, chilling, and packaging. See U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, AIR EMISSIONS
FACTORS AND QUANTIFICATION, MEAT PACKING PLANTS ch. 9.5.1 (1997),
https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/chief/ap42/ch09/final/c9s05-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EVQ-B8NP]
(including a generic process flow diagram and description for meatpacking operations). For
plant size and worker population at Smithfield, see Jessica Lussenhop, Coronavirus at
Smithfield Pork Plant: The Untold Story of America’s Biggest Outbreak, BBC NEWS (Apr.
17,
2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52311877
[https://perma.cc/DB3D-JB9P].
105. See Smithfield Citation, supra note 100, at 6–8 (discussing various means of hazard
abatement without addressing the need for employee training in these areas). The workforce
at Smithfield consists largely of immigrants and refugees from, inter alia, Myanmar, Ethiopia,
Nepal, Congo, and El Salvador. The workers speak 80 different languages. See Lussenhop,
supra note 104.
106. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 602 F.3d
464, 466–68 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (upholding a standard specifying that “each failure to train an
employee may be considered a separate violation” and distinguishing Reich v. Arcadian
Corp., 110 F.3d 1192 (5th Cir. 1997), which involved the General Duty Clause and not
standards promulgated by the Secretary of Labor). The three citations at healthcare facilities,
referenced supra note 99, are for failure to provide employees with respirators, failure to
implement a respiratory protections program, and failure to provide appropriate PPE. See
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., U.S. Department of Labor Cites Hackensack Meridian
Health in North Bergen, New Jersey, for Failing to Protect Employees from Coronavirus
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$14,000 for a single “serious” violation, OSHA could have better fulfilled
its responsibility by charging the company with multiple General Duty
Clause violations across distinct plant operations, and perhaps also
per-employee violations for lack of training — leading to assessed fines
more commensurate with the catastrophic nature of the problems at this
plant.107
Finally, even a single General Duty Clause citation issued in March or
early April would have sent a message not only to Smithfield, but to other
meatpacking plants around the country. Yet despite media coverage and
worker complaints at the time reporting extensive virus outbreaks in these
plants, which were operating without social distancing and PPE protections,
OSHA declared the plants posed no imminent danger to workers, and the
agency declined to perform on-site inspections at any meatpacking plant
until the middle of May.108 The agency then waited until its six month statute
of limitations was about to lapse from the March worker complaints before
issuing a single citation to Smithfield.109 The agency’s course of conduct

(Sept.
11,
2020),
https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/osha/osha20200911-0
[https://perma.cc/58H8-2AU7]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., U.S. Department of Labor
Cites New Jersey Hospital for Failing to Protect Workers from the Coronavirus (Sept. 11,
2020),
https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/osha/osha20200911-2
[https://perma.cc/3BW6-RMYH]. Assuming multiple employees were endangered by each
violation, the violations could have been cited per employee rather than on a facility-wide
basis.
107. The maximum penalty for each serious violation of the Act is $13,494. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 666(b); see also Civil Money Penalty Inflation Adjustments, DEP’T LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/resources/penalties [https://perma.cc/2D22-PM54] (last
visited Oct. 21, 2020) (although the statute states the penalty is up to $7,000 per serious
violation, the fine is $13,494 accounting for inflation). Thus, pursuing citations for five or six
distinct violations of the General Duty Clause might have resulted in penalties between
$65,000 and $80,000. Pursuing citations for serious violations in failing to train scores, if not
hundreds, of employees might have resulted in penalties closer to $1 million. All of this
assumes the violations at Smithfield, which allegedly persisted for weeks, were never more
than serious. If the agency had assessed any of the violations as willful or repeat rather than
just serious, OSHA penalties could have been as high as $134,937 for each violation. See id.
108. See Noam Scheiber, OSHA Criticized for Lax Regulation of Meatpacking in
Pandemic,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
22,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/22/business/economy/osha-coronavirus-meat.html
[https://perma.cc/5UCT-A4MZ].
109. See Kimberly Kindy, More Than 200 Meat Plant Workers in the U.S. Have Died of
COVID-19. Federal Regulators Just Issued Two Modest Fines., WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2020,
9:49
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/osha-covid-meat-plant-fines/2020/09/13/1dca3e1
4-f395-11ea-bc45-e5d48ab44b9f_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-banner-main_meat-plant-10am%
3Ahomepage%2Fstory-ans [https://perma.cc/J5PK-9G7V] (citing to the widespread media
reports in March and April, and OSHA’s response on timing that the agency “met legal
mandates because it has ‘a six month statute of limitations to complete any investigation and
issue a citation’”).
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leaves considerable doubt about its commitment to protecting essential
workers, most at risk for COVID-19, in suitably immediate terms.110
Once again, some states have attempted to fill the substantial federal gap
in regulation and enforcement. As noted earlier, California has acted to make
the CDC Guidelines mandatory.111 And in July 2020, Virginia became the
first state to issue an ETS addressing COVID-19 infectious disease
prevention.112 The state took action through its 14-member health and safety
board after thousands of complaints filed since March and large-scale
outbreaks at two poultry-processing plants.113 The governor’s office added
that it was responding to OSHA’s prolonged lack of enforcement regarding
COVID-19.114
The Virginia standard sets forth requirements for all employers,
encompassing the private and state and local public sectors. These
requirements include conducting workplace assessments focused on
COVID-19 exposure risks; devising and implementing requirements for
social distancing on the job and during breaks; providing access to sufficient
handwashing and related sanitation and disinfectant facilities; ensuring that
employees can see their COVID-19-related exposure and medical records;
developing test-based or symptom-based strategies to enable infected
employees to return to work; and prohibiting discrimination against any
employees for exercising rights under the standard, wearing their own PPE
if not provided by the employer, or raising a reasonable concern about
infection control at the workplace.115
The ETS includes an added set of detailed requirements involving
engineering controls and administrative and work practice controls for

110. See id. (reporting strong concerns expressed by numerous workers’ representatives,
citing the agency’s rebuff to their requests for meetings in March and April, and criticizing
the de minimis nature of citation and fines as effectively an incentive for plants to continue
hazardous operations).
111. Cal/OSHA Interim General Guidelines on Protecting Workers from COVID-19, supra
note 79 (Title 8 § 3203 requires employers to establish an Injury and Illness Prevention
Program (IIPP), and IIPP must be adopted to prevent COVID-19).
112. VA. DEP’T LAB. & INDUS., VAC25-220, EMERGENCY TEMPORARY STANDARD
INFECTIOUS DISEASE PREVENTION: SARS-COV-2 VIRUS THAT CAUSES COVID-19, at 16
(2020)
[hereinafter
VA.
ETS],
https://www.doli.virginia.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/RIS-filed-RTD-Final-ETS-7.24.
2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/HLM5-VRXE] (as adopted by the Safety and Health Codes Board,
July 15, 2020).
113. See Eli Rosenberg, Virginia Adopts Nation’s First Coronavirus Workplace Safety
Rules After Labor Groups Decry Federal Inaction, WASH. POST (July 15, 2020, 4:48 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/07/15/coronavirus-workplace-regulation-sa
fety-virginia/ [https://perma.cc/L9VG-JYZJ].
114. See id.
115. See VA. ETS, supra note 112, at 14–20, 34. The Standard’s coverage of private and
public employers is set forth in VA. ETS § 10(C). See id. at 2.
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employers, and provision of PPE and training on hazard recognition and
prevention for employees. These additional requirements are linked to
hazards or job tasks classified as very high or high exposure risk, with a
parallel set of engineering, administrative, PPE, and training requirements
for hazards or job tasks classified as medium exposure risk.116 The
definitions section of the ETS identifies occupations within these categories.
High-exposure jobs in the context of COVID-19 include healthcare delivery
and support services, first-responder services, and medical transport
services.117 Medium exposure jobs may include, but are not limited to,
employees working in poultry, meat, and seafood processing; agriculture and
hand labor; grocery stores, convenience stores, and food banks; drug stores
and pharmacies; and correctional facilities.118 Employers who violate the
standard may be fined up to $13,000; willful and repeat violators face
penalties of up to $130,000.119
The Virginia ETS represents an important step forward given the absence
of leadership from the federal government. Nonetheless, Virginia is a truly
exceptional instance; only one other state has indicated an interest in such an
initiative,120 and with OSHA’s refusal to act, there remains a huge gap in the
ability to require and enforce meaningful protections.
D. Hazard Pay
FE workers who are healthcare providers; healthcare support workers; and
first responders, such as police and firefighters, face especially high risks of
exposure to COVID-19 on a persistent and hazardous basis. As noted earlier,
FE workers employed at grocery, convenience, or drug stores; building
cleaning services; and childcare and social services are likely to earn low
incomes and experience severe financial straits as they interact with
customers, clients, and each other in confined spaces.121 In these

116. See id. at 22–26, 32.
117. See id. at 8–9.
118. See id.
119. See Alex Gangitano, Virginia Becomes First State to Issue Work Safety Standards for
Coronavirus,
HILL
(July
15,
2020,
4:43
PM),
https://thehill.com/news-by-subject/labor/507531-virginia-becomes-first-state-to-issue-stand
ard-for-worker-protections [https://perma.cc/V86L-B6EG]; Rosenberg, supra note 113.
120. Oregon announced its intention to promulgate an ETS on COVID-19 and airborne
infectious disease by September 2020, to be effective until early 2021, and then replaced by
a permanent standard. The state has revised its timeline, projecting an ETS in October
followed by a proposed permanent standard with a public comment period lasting until March
15, 2021. See Potential Oregon OSHA Rulemaking Timeline: COVID-19/Infectious Diseases,
OR.
OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY
&
HEALTH
(Oct.
5,
2020),
https://osha.oregon.gov/rules/advisory/infectiousdisease/Documents/Infectious-Disease-Pub
lic-Timeline.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WWD-28ZK].
121. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
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circumstances, FE workers have argued that in providing critical services for
the country, and risking their personal and family health to do so, the market
and government should recognize and compensate for their sacrifice.
A few large companies such as Amazon, Kroger, and Target initiated
voluntary hazard pay policies in the first weeks of the pandemic. But they
discontinued the pay increases by the end of May, although some later added
extensions for employees working through June or July.122 Those hazard
pay premiums compensated workers with no real choice but to come to work
at a time when the rest of the country was shut down. While many jobs have
returned, the health risks of being a meatpacking worker, grocery store
cashier, or home healthcare provider remain high. Given that millions are
out of work for the foreseeable future, lower-paid FE workers have little
choice but to continue without a hazard pay premium, especially because
most employees who decide to quit are not eligible for unemployment
benefits.123 As one economist explained, “[i]f you’re an essential worker,
there’s no other job than the job you currently have . . . [you’re] basically
forced labor.”124 Unions have succeeded in negotiating hazard pay for FE
workers at specific plant locations and in a handful of company-wide
collective bargaining agreements,125 but such agreements are limited to
settings where unions have sufficient bargaining strength to prevail in the
current exigent circumstances.
Legislative proposals on hazard pay for private-sector FE workers have
not been approved by Congress and have not fared especially well in state
legislatures.126 Some states and local governments have enacted short-term

122. See Anders Melin & Ben Steverman, Essential Workers Are Losing Their ‘Hazard
Pay’ Even as the Pandemic Rages On, TIME (May 14, 2020, 8:17 AM),
https://time.com/5836736/essential-workers-hazard-pay/
[https://perma.cc/FN5B-LZ9V];
Michael Williams, Which Chains Are Still Paying Workers a Pandemic Premium?, TIMES
UNION
(July
9,
2020,
5:28
PM),
https://www.timesunion.com/business/article/Which-chains-are-still-paying-their-employees
-15397586.php [https://perma.cc/R8ZV-4FPV].
123. Jack Healy, Workers Fearful of the Coronavirus Are Getting Fired and Losing Their
Benefits,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
10,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/04/us/virus-unemployment-fired.html
[https://perma.cc/H46A-548R].
124. Melin & Steverman, supra note 122 (quoting Columbia University economics
professor Suresh Naidu).
125. See infra Section II.F (discussing agreements reached with large supermarket chains,
certain meatpacking plants, and a major telecommunications company).
126. See The Health & Economic Recovery Omnibus Emergency Solutions Act, H.R.
6800, 116th Cong. (as approved by House, May 15, 2020). The HEROES Act, passed by the
House in May but never taken up by the Senate, provides for hazard pay to a range of
public-facing workers in essential industries, in the form of a $13 hourly pay premium (up to
$10,000) from the start of the pandemic until 60 days after the last day of the public health
emergency. See Fact Sheet: Health and Economic Recovery Omnibus Emergency Solutions
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hazard pay or hazard stipends for identified public-sector employees, often
linked to negotiated arrangements with unions representing those workers.
The amounts involved range from relatively modest to quite substantial.
Examples at the state level include hazard pay for correctional workers in
Maine, Ohio, and Michigan; police and other first responders in New
Hampshire and Washington DC; and certain healthcare workers in
Massachusetts and Maine.127 Local governments have enacted similar
temporary measures, including in regions of the country where unions do not
represent public-sector workers.128

Act (HEROES Act - H.R. 6800), INT’L BROTHERHOOD TEAMSTERS (June 2020),
https://teamster.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/HEROES-Act-fact-sheet-revised.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KT75-M64X]. In Wyoming, the legislature rejected, without any
discussion, a proposed hazard pay bill for employees at risk of contracting COVID-19. See
Nick Reynolds & Morgan Hughes, With No Discussion, Legislature Rejects Hazard Pay for
State
Employees,
CASPER
STAR
TRIB.
(June
21,
2020),
https://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/with-no-discussion-legislature-rej
ects-hazard-pay-for-state-employees/article_ee3079ae-43d8-547d-a8a3-6010dfe7a752.html
[https://perma.cc/GY5L-9JFT]. Louisiana has enacted a law providing one-time hazard pay
checks of $250 for workers who certify they worked 200 front-line hours between March 22
and May 14. The limited funding is available first-come first-served to law enforcement and
healthcare personnel, but also to some private-sector FE workers, such as grocery store and
mortuary employees. See Ashley White, How Louisiana Frontline Workers Can Apply for the
$250 Coronavirus ‘Hazard Pay,’ LAFAYETTE DAILY ADVERTISER (Aug. 5, 2020, 6:56 PM),
https://www.theadvertiser.com/story/news/2020/07/14/how-apply-louisiana-hazard-pay-fron
t-line-workers-coronavirus/5428664002/ [https://perma.cc/2W4T-CEU9].
127. On the modest side are D.C.’s addition of $14 per diem for all employees required to
come to work, continuing as long as the District can afford it, and Maine’s temporary increase
of $3 to $5 per hour for workers in state mental health and correctional facilities. See Abigail
Constantino, DC Authorizes Hazard Pay for Workers Who Must Physically Report to Work,
WTOP
(Apr.
14,
2020,
11:54
PM),
https://wtop.com/dc/2020/04/dc-authorizes-extra-pay-for-workers-who-must-physically-rep
ort-to-work/ [https://perma.cc/DE58-ZNVK]; Maine Governor to Provide Hazard Pay to
State Corrections and Mental Health Workers, AFSCME COUNCIL 93 (Apr. 5, 2020),
http://www.afscme93.org/2020/04/05/blogpost/maine-governor-to-provide-hazard-pay-to-st
ate-corrections-and-mental-health-workers/?fbclid=IwAR030Nas0FhJ4tAoi18xqhkwLCUO
omo1YGpveaYPi2rMjEhQ_dLExrWA8Q0 [https://perma.cc/9V23-ZE95]. More substantial
provisions are New Hampshire’s addition of $300 per week for full-time and $150 per week
for part-time employees working as police officers, firefighters, EMTs, corrections officers,
and other first responders, and Michigan’s $750 premium per biweekly pay period for
corrections officers. See James David Dickson, Mich. COs Get Hazard Pay, Dispute Use of
Sick
Time
for
Quarantines,
CORRECTIONS1
(Apr.
12,
2020),
https://www.corrections1.com/coronavirus-covid-19/articles/mich-cos-get-hazard-pay-dispu
te-use-of-sick-time-for-quarantines-cNVnQ6TC85ZJ2ott/ [https://perma.cc/SM2U-5LPY];
Laura French, Local Governments Providing Hazard Pay, Stipends for First Responders,
CORRECTIONS1
(May
27,
2020),
https://www.corrections1.com/coronavirus-covid-19/articles/local-governments-providing-h
azard-pay-stipends-for-first-responders-Oe7UtIA42phouiP4/
[https://perma.cc/4EKF-AWKK].
128. For example, Forsyth County in Georgia approved hazard pay for employees at risk
of exposure, including an additional $500 monthly payment for employees in contact with the
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These successful efforts reflect recognition from elected representatives
that public-sector FE workers deserve special compensation for the health
risks they bear. Still, the hazard payments expire within a relatively short
time frame,129 although the heightened risks associated with their FE
positions will continue for months, if not years, to come. And for privatesector FE workers, who are lower-paid and less likely to be represented by
unions, there has been no hazard pay beyond what a few large employers
granted and then withdrew in the initial weeks and months of the pandemic,
or what has been negotiated in a handful of union settings.
E. Whistleblower Protections and Rights to Refuse Unsafe Work
Absent regulatory standards or requirements in the face of COVID-19,
some protections are available for FE workers seeking to avoid extraordinary
risks to their health.
Perhaps most directly relevant is OSHA’s
whistleblower provision, protecting employees against discharge or
discrimination for exercising their rights under the Act.130 Yet of 1,744
COVID-19-related retaliation complaints filed by workers from the start of
the pandemic through mid-August, OSHA docketed just one in five for any
investigation and resolved only 2% (35 of 1,744) in this period covering
more than five months — it is not known whether those were resolved in a
manner that benefited the workers.131

public and $250 monthly payment for employees who cannot socially distance or must enter
private residences. See Kelly Whitmire, Forsyth County Commits to COVID-19 Hazard Pay
for
Employees,
FORSYTH CNTY. NEWS (Apr.
22,
2020,
1:23
PM),
https://www.forsythnews.com/news/government/forsyth-county-commits-covid-19-hazard-p
ay-employees/ [https://perma.cc/49CV-5ABH]. Boaz City Council in Alabama enacted
hazard pay in the amount of $200 a month for first responders who come into contact with
others while working. See Stefante Randall, Boaz First Responders Receive Hazard Pay Amid
COVID-19
Pandemic,
WAFF48
(Apr.
29,
2020,
11:37
PM),
https://www.waff.com/2020/04/29/boaz-first-responders-receive-hazard-pay-amid-covid-pa
ndemic/ [https://perma.cc/F459-5KX7].
129. Michigan hazard pay provisions expired when the governor lifted the stay-at-home
order, while the New Hampshire pay was set to expire at the end of June 2020. See Kevin
Landrigan, Extra Pay, Expanded Testing for Front-Line Workers, N.H. UNION LEADER (Apr.
15,
2020),
https://www.unionleader.com/news/health/coronavirus/extra-pay-expanded-testing-for-front
-line-workers/article_dc175d03-1dcc-5b13-b05c-d31348fc66c5.html
[https://perma.cc/B2NM-XLZ7]. The provisions enacted by Boaz County Council last until
all employees return to working normal hours, while the Forsyth Country premium expired
after six pay periods. See Whitmire, supra note 128; Kerry Yencer, Boaz Council OK Hazard
Pay for Police and Fire Employees, GADSDEN TIMES (Apr. 14, 2020, 4:19 PM),
https://www.gadsdentimes.com/news/20200414/boaz-council-ok-hazard-pay-for-police-and
-fire-employees [https://perma.cc/8SHM-LMQD].
130. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(c).
131. See Deborah Berkowitz & Shayla Thompson, OSHA Must Protect COVID
Whistleblowers Who File Retaliation Complaints, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT (Oct.8, 2020),
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Private-sector employees who report safety and health violations or
dangers may be protected from retaliation under other whistleblower statutes
enacted at both federal and state levels. A wide range of federal laws
includes anti-retaliation provisions, although these provisions focus on
employee participation in investigations or enforcement proceedings rather
than specifically referencing safety or health issues.132
The Supreme Court has cast serious doubt on the extent to which these
laws protect undocumented workers — a notable segment of the FE
population — when they claim retaliation for reporting workplace
violations.133 A potential alternative source of support for undocumented
workers is the U-Visa, which grants non-immigrant status (including work
authorization) to immigrants who have assisted in specific law enforcement
matters.134 However, while some workplace-related crimes qualify for
U-Visa certification, DOL has limited its certification authority to wage and
hour violations, thus excluding workers who provide assistance in
investigating or prosecuting safety and health violations.135
State laws offer safeguards to whistleblowers who are FE workers, but the
safeguards rely on varying legal standards that highlight the absence of a
uniform federal approach. A number of states specify that private- or publicsector employees must demonstrate an actual violation of safety and health
law by their employer in order to be protected from retaliation.136 These

https://www.nelp.org/publication/osha-failed-protect-whistleblowers-filed-covid-retaliationcomplaints/ [https://perma.cc/9CJF-F4SM]. On the indeterminate nature of the 35 resolved
complaints, the authors explain that OSHA does not make outcomes public or explain any
settlements it has reached. See id.
132. See, e.g., Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §
1855 (protecting workers from retaliation for exercising “with just cause” any right or
protection under the Act); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (protecting against retaliation for making
charges or assisting in enforcement proceedings under Title VII); The federal Whistleblower
Protection Act explicitly applies when an employee reports information she “reasonably
believes evidences . . . a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 1213(a)(1)(B). This law, however, covers only federal government employees.
133. See Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (denying relief
to undocumented worker discharged in violation of NLRA). Lower courts are divided as to
whether undocumented workers are protected under Title VII. Compare Egbuna v. Time-Life
Librs., Inc., 153 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (not covered against retaliation claims),
with Iweala v. Operational Techs. Servs., Inc., 634 F. Supp.2d 73 (D.D.C. 2009) (covered).
134. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii) (setting forth criminal activities for which
immigrants who provide prosecutorial assistance may be eligible for U-Visa certification). U
nonimmigrant status has been available pursuant to U.S. Department of Health & Human
Services regulations since 2007. See Rachel Nadas, Justice for Workplace Crimes: An
Immigration Law Remedy, 19 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 137, 150 (2016).
135. See Nadas, supra note 134, at 153–54.
136. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.102(3) (applied in Graddy v. Wal-Mart Stores E.,
LP., 237 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1226–28 (M.D. Fla. 2017)); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a)
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laws offer no real protection unless the state has imposed safety and health
requirements linked to COVID-19 exposure on employers. Other states
apply a less stringent standard, requiring whistleblowing employees to
demonstrate an objectively reasonable belief that there was a safety or health
violation.137 And protections for whistleblowers employed at healthcare
facilities may be somewhat stronger if the workers complain in good faith
about unsafe working conditions, improper quality of care, or violations of a
statute or rule.138
All of these state and federal laws come into play only after an employee
has been retaliated against — almost invariably by termination. In order to
prevail in a retaliation claim, the worker likely must establish that
termination was due to the specific and objectively supported assertion of a
danger to public safety or health. Employees may be reluctant to risk job
security by reporting on such dangers, especially during a period of
large-scale unemployment and economic uncertainty. Such reluctance
would appear reasonable with respect to COVID-19, given that the CDC and
OSHA have failed to designate specific workplace practices as mandatory to
protect against safety and health dangers, and with few exceptions, the states
have followed the federal government’s purely advisory lead. Seeking
protection from OSHA seems especially futile, inasmuch as the DOL Office
of Inspector General has reported on the agency’s inadequate job of
processing COVID-19-related and other whistleblower complaints.139
Finally, anti-retaliation provisions following a termination have provided
meager protection for low-wage workers such as those serving in most FE
occupational areas.140

(McKinney 2019) (applied in Bordell v. Gen. Elec. Co., 622 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1002 (App. Div.
1995)).
137. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1102(5)(b), 6310 (West 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
34:19-3(a)(1) (West 2006). For COVID-19-related complaints recently filed under the New
Jersey whistleblower provision, see Complaint at 7–8, Rossi v. Alberti, CAM-L-001864-20
(N.J. Super. Ct. June 1, 2020); Complaint ¶¶ 117–38, Leibovitz v. Hope Cmty. Charter Sch.
Found., CAM-L-001891-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. June 3, 2020).
138. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.20180 (West 2002); WASH. REV. CODE §
43.70.075 (2019).
139. See Vin Guerreri, OSHA Whistleblower Claims Jump Amid Virus, Watchdog Says,
LAW360
(Aug.
18,
2020,
10:00
PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1302387/osha-whistleblower-claims-jump-amid-virus-wat
chdog-says [https://perma.cc/T4TB-8QCA]; see also supra text accompanying note 131
(discussing 1,744 COVID-19-related retaliation complaints filed with OSHA).
140. This is partly because their limited monetary stakes make it difficult for these workers
to attract interested and workplace-experienced counsel, but also because mandatory
arbitration provisions result in contests against well-resourced employers who may well be
repeat players with an arbitrator. See Alexander Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment
Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 445
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Apart from post-hoc efforts to respond to retaliatory termination, FE
workers also may have certain rights to refuse unsafe work. There are three
sources for such a right under federal law. One is a regulation promulgated
in the early years of the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act. The
employee must have a reasonable apprehension of “a real danger of death or
serious injury,” ordinarily have sought but “been unable to obtain[] a
correction of the dangerous condition” from his employer, and resort to
normal statutory enforcement channels must be shown to be ineffective “due
to the urgency of the situation.”141 This OSH Act protection is far more
limited than a right to walk off the job based on potential unsafe
conditions.142 FE workers unable to persuade their employers to correct
serious COVID-19-related exposures may be unwilling to risk being
suspended or fired on the chance that their refusal will be found objectively
reasonable many months later. Their reluctance may be even stronger given
that they have no private right of action: only the Secretary of Labor is
authorized to bring a civil action to vindicate refusal to work under the
regulation.143
A second possible federal avenue of protection for refusing unsafe work
is Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Section 7 gives
employees a right to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or
protection, including to protect against what they perceive to be working
conditions endangering their safety and health, without being subject to
employer reprisal.144 However, if the workers are covered under a collective
agreement that contains a no-strike clause, this is likely to prohibit a
concerted refusal to work during the life of the agreement.145 Further,
employers confronting a collective refusal to work under assertedly unsafe

(2007); Alexander Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employment,
35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 83–85 (2014).
141. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2). The Supreme Court upheld this regulation as consistent
with the statute in Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980).
142. See 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(1) (making this point in express terms).
143. See id. § 660(c)(2).
144. See id. § 157; see, e.g., NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 12–13 (1962)
(applying protected right to employees walking off job in non-union setting); see also NLRB
v. Tamara Foods, Inc., 692 F.2d 1171, 1176 (8th Cir. 1982) (upholding as concerted and
protected activity refusal of non-union employees to work because they believed that
ammonia fumes posed a danger; subsequent employer discipline violated the NLRA); Matsu
Corp., 368 N.L.R.B. No.16 (June 28, 2019) (ordering reinstatement with backpay for
employees who were discharged for concertedly refusing to work an extra shift because of
health and safety concerns).
145. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 247–49, 253–
54 (1970). In addition, unionized employees at healthcare institutions are required to give ten
days’ notice “before engaging in any strike, picketing, or other concerted refusal to work.” 29
U.S.C. § 158(g); see also Minn. Licensed Prac. Nurses Ass’n v. NLRB, 406 F.3d 1020, 1023–
24 (8th Cir. 2005).
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conditions, especially a refusal that extends over a period of time, are
permitted to hire permanent replacements for these employees.146
The third federal source of protection is Section 502 of the Labor
Management Relations Act. Section 502 allows unionized workers to avoid
the aforementioned restrictions of a collectively bargained no-strike clause
by providing that an individual or collective refusal to work “in good faith
because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work” is not classified as a
strike.147 In 1999, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) held that a
work stoppage is protected under Section 502 if: (i) “the employees believed
in good-faith that their working conditions were abnormally dangerous;” (ii)
“that their belief was a contributing cause of the work stoppage;” (iii) “that
the employees’ belief is supported by ascertainable, objective evidence;” and
(iv) “that the perceived danger posed an immediate threat of harm to
employee health or safety.”148 The key elements of this test — a subjective
good faith belief, supported by some objective evidence, and the immediacy
of the threat — seem likely to justify FE workers refusing to participate
under a range of COVID-19-related workplace conditions. At the same time,
the Board’s 1999 legal standard is open to reconsideration in the current
setting if challenged by businesses seeking a more employer-friendly
interpretation of Section 502. Such a challenge seems quite possible in the
COVID-19 context, given a conservative NLRB, and an arguable tension
between the 1999 “good faith” test and language in an earlier Supreme Court
decision suggesting a stricter standard.149
State law has responded to whether employees may refuse what they
regard as unsafe work in the COVID-19 setting.150 This response, however,
has not been directed primarily at the hazards confronting FE workers.

146. See, e.g., NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345–46 (1938) (stating
that an employer who decides to permanently replace lawful strikers in order to protect and
continue his business does not engage in an unlawful reprisal).
147. 29 U.S.C. § 143. This provision may be asserted on behalf of an individual worker,
but its greater impact on labor law is when invoked by a group of workers. Because this
collective refusal to engage in unsafe work is not treated as a strike, the workers may not be
permanently replaced under Mackay Radio.
148. TNS, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 602, 603 (1999). Although a court of appeals denied
enforcement of the Board’s order on other factual grounds, it endorsed the test quoted above,
largely based on deference to the reasonableness of the agency’s judgment. See TNS, Inc. v.
NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 391–93 (6th Cir. 2002).
149. See, e.g., Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 386–87
(1974) (construing Section 502 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 143,
referring at one point to what could be deemed an abnormal-danger-in-fact test, explaining
the need for “objective evidence that [abnormally dangerous] conditions actually obtain,” but
then going on to state that the “ascertainable, objective evidence” must simply support the
union’s good faith “conclusion that an abnormally dangerous condition for work exists”).
150. This is in contrast to the federal law sources on refusing unsafe work, all of which
predate, by decades, the COVID-19 pandemic.
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Rather, states re-opening their economies, after months of sheltering at home
in early 2020, have focused on possible justifications for a returning
non-essential worker’s refusal to work, in particular, whether that worker is
disqualified from unemployment benefits for rejecting “suitable”
employment when offered. Some states have issued guidance explaining
that especially vulnerable workers (e.g., those over 65-years-old,
immune-compromised, or with certain chronic health conditions) have good
cause to refuse work and employers should seek alternative work options
such as telework or modified schedules.151 States also have specified that
even non-high-risk workers may refuse to return without losing
unemployment benefits if their workplace has “COVID-19-related
demonstrable, unsafe working conditions.”152 Other states have chosen a
different emphasis, encouraging employers to report workers who decline to
return so their unemployment benefits are stopped as soon as possible.153
One state with a prior statute addressing the right to refuse unsafe work is
New Jersey. New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA)
confers a right to “refuse[] to participate in any activity, policy or practice
which the employee reasonably believes . . . is incompatible with a clear
mandate of public policy concerning the public health[] [or] safety.”154 The
New Jersey Supreme Court has broadly interpreted CEPA’s public policy
mandate in a number of its decisions.155 The presence of CEPA, combined
with New Jersey’s detailed guidance regarding protection from COVID-19
health hazards for essential workers as well as others,156 indicates that an FE

151. See, e.g., FAQs on Essential and Non-essential Workers, CAL. DEP’T INDUS. RELS.
(Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/Essential-and-Non-essential-Workers.htm
[https://perma.cc/FT8B-9DPG] (not applicable to individuals who work in essential services).
152. Colo. Exec. Order No. D 2020 044, pt. II.K, at 5 (Apr. 26, 2020).
153. See Press Release, Ala. Dep’t of Lab., Refusal of Work Can Cause a Disqualification
in
Unemployment
Compensation
Benefits
(Apr.
23,
2020),
https://labor.alabama.gov/news_feed/News_Page.aspx?id=226
[https://perma.cc/FE8J-BK9Z].
154. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3(c)(3) (West 2006); see also Carolyn Dellatore, Blowing the
Whistle on CEPA: Why New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act Has Gone Too
Far, 32 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 375, 383–84 (2008) (discussing CEPA enactment in 1986
intended to codify New Jersey’s broad public policy exception to employment at will).
155. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Montville Township Bd. of Educ., 843 A.2d 1091 (N.J. 2004),
aff’g 808 A.2d 128, 132–33 (N.J. App. Div. 2002) (protecting an experienced and
safety-trained school custodian based on his reasonable belief that unsanitary bathroom
conditions and burned-out exit sign were violations of health and safety rules); Mehlman v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 707 A.2d 1000, 1015 (N.J. 1998) (protecting an employee when he relied
on guidelines that gasoline with more than 5% benzene levels was hazardous to human
health). See generally Dellatore, supra note 154, at 387–99 (discussing these and other New
Jersey Supreme Court decisions).
156. See, e.g., Prohibited COVID-19 Related Employment Discrimination, 52 NJR 4(2)
(2020); COVID-19 Related Discrimination, N.J. DEP’T LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV.,
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worker’s right to refuse unsafe work related to coronavirus risks may have
serious traction in that state.
The New Jersey example is exceptional, inasmuch as CEPA may well be
the most expansive state law in the country protecting employees from
termination for refusal to violate a clear mandate of public policy.157
Workers in other states bringing causes of action linked to violations of
safety and health laws or regulations face tougher obstacles. In the end, both
state and federal claims asserting protection for refusal to engage in unsafe
work require case-by-case analysis of employer-specific factual
circumstances and applicable legal standards on behalf of one or more FE
workers.
F. The Role of Unions in Bargained-for and Legislated Protections
Unionized employees constitute a small proportion of the U.S. workforce,
but they have been able to secure protections in many areas that exceed what
federal or state law have provided.158 To cite a handful of examples,
unionized grocery store employees at several national supermarket chains
have successfully bargained for temporary hazard pay, 14 days paid sick
leave for COVID-19 cases, permission to wear masks and gloves, and
measures to protect employees from customers (such as barriers at checkout,
limits on the number of customers in the store at once, and signage
encouraging social distancing).159 Unionized postal workers negotiated for
additional paid sick leave, including for dependent care, and an expansion of

https://www.nj.gov/labor/worker-protections/covid_discrimination.shtml
[https://perma.cc/MV44-DMAF] (last visited Sept. 29, 2020).
157. See Dellatore, supra note 154, at 377. Public safety officers recently filed a complaint
alleging a CEPA violation based on termination for objecting to transporting potentially
COVID-19-infected students when plaintiffs had no instruction, training, or guidance on how
to do so. See Complaint and Jury Demand at 6, Coley v. Princeton Univ., No.
MER-L-001108-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. June 19, 2020). Other states have acted by Executive
Order in recent months. See, e.g., Minn. Emergency Exec. Order No. 20-54, ¶ 3 (May 13,
2020) (explaining the right to refuse work that employees reasonably believe requires work
in unsafe or unhealthful manner regarding exposure to COVID-19 or other infectious agent).
158. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Kroger, UFCW Announce Increased Pay, Benefits for Grocery Workers on
Front
Lines
of
Coronavirus
Outbreak,
UFCW
(Mar.
31,
2020),
http://www.ufcw.org/2020/03/31/krogercoronavirus/
[https://perma.cc/XE37-BUR4]
(discussing UFCW agreement covering 460,000 Kroger workers across the country). For a
similar agreement with Safeway workers at San Francisco Bay Area stores, see Local 5
Reaches Agreement with Safeway to Add Protections for Workers During Pandemic Crisis,
UFCW,
https://ufcw5.org/2020/03/local-5-reaches-agreement-with-safeway-to-add-protections-forworkers-pandemic-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/MG3H-XGYZ] (last visited Sept. 5, 2020).
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teleworking policies.160 Unionized meatpacking employees negotiated
hazard pay for workers at one major employer161 and temperature checks and
a series of PPE protections for employees at other major company plants.162
Unionized workers at AT&T bargained for a 20% bonus for all time worked
during the pandemic.163 And bus drivers in several cities negotiated
increased protections, including a requirement that passengers use rear doors
as their entrance.164
In addition to securing safety and health protections with respect to
individual employers through collective bargaining, unions representing
workers in the airline industry lobbied successfully for major industry-wide
payroll and employment protections as part of the CARES Act.165 Through
a dedicated subtitle of the Act, the federal government provided $32 billion

160. For a discussion of APWU agreements, see Eric Katz, USPS Tests New Ways to
Protect Employees from Coronavirus, GOV’T EXEC. (May 19, 2020),
https://www.govexec.com/workforce/2020/05/usps-tests-new-ways-protect-employees-coro
navirus/165514/ [https://perma.cc/BC7P-MUL2].
161. For a discussion of UFCW agreement covering 7,000 Cargill workers at plants located
in three states, see While Some Employers Roll Back “Hero Pay,” New UFCW Agreement
with
Cargill
Makes
It
Permanent,
UFCW
(June
17,
2020),
http://www.ufcw.org/2020/06/17/cargillagreement/ [https://perma.cc/U7GJ-X7H7].
162. For a discussion of UFCW agreements covering meatpacking plants in Wisconsin, see
Press Release, Urb. Milwaukee, UFCW Local 1473 Announces Universal Free Coronavirus
Testing
for
Patrick
Cudahy
Workers
(Apr.
24,
2020),
https://urbanmilwaukee.com/pressrelease/ufcw-local-1473-announces-universal-free-corona
virus-testing-for-patrick-cudahy-workers/ [https://perma.cc/NBE9-R98N].
163. See CWA District 9 (@D9action), FACEBOOK (Mar. 24, 2020),
https://www.facebook.com/D9action/posts/3343562335657879
[https://perma.cc/S27E-BF2Y].
164. See, e.g., Slaughter, supra note 84 (discussing union-backed job action by Detroit bus
drivers); see also BJCTA Responds to Max Bus Drivers on Strike in Birmingham Due to
COVID-19
Concerns,
WVTM13
(Mar.
23,
2020,
5:02
PM),
https://www.wvtm13.com/article/some-max-drivers-go-on-strike-over-covid-19-concerns/3
1895933# [https://perma.cc/3B5Q-UFAS] (discussing the Birmingham, Alabama, response
to job action by non-union bus drivers).
165. For a discussion of the support provided by the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA),
see Michele Haydel Gehrke et al., CARES Act Enacted Just in Time to Give the Airline
Industry
Much
Needed
Lift,
REED
SMITH
(Mar.
28,
2020),
https://www.employmentlawwatch.com/2020/03/articles/employment-us/cares-act-enacted-j
ust-in-time-to-give-the-airline-industry-much-needed-lift/ [https://perma.cc/Z43F-Y9N5].
For support from the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA), see Flight Attendants Win
Relief for Workers, Not Corporations, ASS’N FLIGHT ATTENDANTS-CWA (Mar. 25, 2020),
https://www.afacwa.org/flight_attendants_win_relief_for_workers_not_corporations
[https://perma.cc/J8AF-69A8]. For support from the Machinists Union, see Machinists Union
Wins Critical Provisions for Working People in Coronavirus Relief Bill, INT’L ASS’N
MACHINISTS
&
AEROSPACE
WORKERS
(Mar.
26,
2020),
https://www.goiam.org/news/machinists-union-wins-critical-provisions-for-working-peoplein-coronavirus-relief-bill-2/ [https://perma.cc/9FCH-NE3J].

38

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVIII

in financial assistance to the airline industry.166 In order to receive federal
funding, airline carriers could not furlough workers or make pay cuts until
September 30, 2020, and they are prohibited from repurchasing stock, paying
dividends, or making any other capital redistributions until September 30,
2021.167 Besides preserving compensation for airline workers while
restricting diversion of corporate assets to management or shareholders,
other provisions place strict limits on compensation increases, termination
pay, and severance benefits for highly compensated executives and
contractors.168 Legislative proponents were explicit in recognizing how the
funding provisions assured strong industry-wide protections for workers as
a condition to rescuing large corporations.169
The enacted industry-wide approach preserved the employment status of
up to two million airline employees. In this respect, it differs dramatically
from the basic U.S. pandemic-response model, which has relegated tens of
millions of employees to unemployment status. They scramble to collect
benefits on a state-by-state basis from overburdened unemployment
insurance (UI) systems while no longer guaranteed the same jobs when
conditions improve.170
Intriguingly, many European Union countries have adopted
employment-preservation approaches similar to Congress’s airline industry
solution in order to weather the pandemic’s economic fallout.171 State
funding in those countries has kept a substantial proportion of wages flowing
to workers even when their activity is reduced or ceases; this has allowed
employers to retain and eventually welcome back an experienced workforce
while contributing to a shared sense of solidarity during the crisis.172 And

166. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No.
116-136, Title IV, subtitle B, § 4120, 134 Stat. 281 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 9080).
167. See id. § 4114(a)(1)–(4).
168. See id. § 4114(a)(1), (3).
169. See, e.g., 166 CONG. REC. S2026 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2020) (statement of Sen.
Schumer); id. at S1926 (statement of Sen. Brown); id. at S2025 (statement of Sen. Cantwell).
170. See Peter S. Goodman et al., European Workers Draw Paychecks. American Workers
Scrounge
for
Food.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
3,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/03/business/economy/europe-us-jobless-coronavirus.htm
l [https://perma.cc/5EA3-E452].
171. See id. (discussing how government wage subsidy programs keep furloughed workers
employed in France, Germany, Netherlands, Ireland, Britain, and Spain).
172. See id.; see also TORSTEN MÜLLER & THORSTEN SCHULTEN, EUR. TRADE UNION INST.,
ENSURING FAIR SHORT-TIME WORK — A EUROPEAN OVERVIEW 1 (2020),
https://www.etui.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/Covid-19%2BShort-time%2Bwork%2BM%
C3%BCller%2BSchulten%2BPolicy%2BBrief%2B2020.07%281%29.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RQ8Q-RU93]; Carolyn Look, Explaining Kurzarbeit, or Saving Jobs the
German
Way,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
10,
2020,
4:50
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/explaining-kurzarbeit-or-saving-jobs-the-german
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while there were some challenges in the implementation of CARES Act
airline worker protections,173 pushback from unions and legislators had a
corrective influence.174
* * * *
The airlines’ industry-wide initiative for protecting workers’ basic income
and job rights should serve as a template for a parallel legislative approach
in the area of safety and health. Similarly, the importance of collective
pressure in securing even limited safety and health protections for FE
workers suggests that legislative change should enhance the role of that
collective pressure going forward. FE workers face major ongoing risks as
they are asked, or required, to serve and protect the country as a whole. The
occasional employer-specific successes described in this Part, set against a
general backdrop of federal inactivity or abdication, indicate that a different
approach is needed.
III. PROPOSED LEGAL REFORMS
COVID-19 is likely to be a public health and economic crisis well into the
future, and other widespread airborne infectious diseases may follow.175

-way/2020/04/07/8376f762-78e7-11ea-a311-adb1344719a9_story.html
[https://perma.cc/73JD-NKP7].
173. A few airlines cut hours for certain groups of workers, incurring the wrath of unions
and lawmakers at various times. See AFA Letter to Senate Commerce: Involuntary Reduction
in Hours Side-Steps Congressional Intent for CARES Act, ASS’N FLIGHT ATTENDANTS-CWA
(May
6,
2020),
https://www.afacwa.org/letter_senatecommerce_involuntary_reduction_hours_intent_caresa
ct [https://perma.cc/TY2M-Q8VJ]. Thirteen Senators wrote a letter to Delta, demanding a
reversal of the hours-slashing policy. See Letter from Elizabeth Warren et al., Sen., U.S.
Senate, to Ed Bastain, Chief Exec. Officer, Delta Air Lines, Inc. (May 20, 2020),
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/afacwa/pages/103/attachments/original/1590111402
/Warren-Letter-Delta-CARES-Act-Compliance.pdf?1590111402
[https://perma.cc/Y4V6-H8GL].
174. One airline subsequently walked back its previously announced plan for hours
reductions in the face of ongoing criticism and a lawsuit filing. For an article on Machinists
Union lawsuit to prevent cuts, see Lauren Zumbach, Union Files Lawsuit to Halt United’s
Plan to Reduce 15,000 Airport Workers’ Hours as Coronavirus Cost Cuts Continue, CHI.
TRIB.
(May
6,
2020,
6:40
AM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/coronavirus/ct-coronavirus-chicago-united-airlines-cuts-w
orker-hours-20200501-7qxpmb2sqndtjbzwevszy2kit4-story.html
[https://perma.cc/X7CM-LW2B]. See also Chris Isidore, New United CEO Says He Doesn’t
Want to Cut Any Jobs Despite Crisis, CNN (May 20, 2020, 6:43 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/20/business/united-no-job-cuts/index.html
[https://perma.cc/D869-A99T] (discussing airline CEO’s more recent statement wishing to
avoid all cuts in hours).
175. For an overview of the H1N1 influenza pandemic of 2009, with global deaths
estimated at more than 550,000, see 2009 H1N1 Pandemic (H1N1pdm09 virus), CTRS. FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION
(June
11,
2019),
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/2009-h1n1-pandemic.html
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One necessary federal response, for which authorizing legislation already
exists,176 is a federal workplace standard, similar to Virginia’s, that
prescribes a coherent approach to protection at various levels of exposure.
Structural components for such a standard should include administrative and
engineering controls, PPE protections, provision for recording and reporting
infections, training and education for workers and supervisors, and
anti-retaliation protections for workers who raise safety and health concerns.
Beyond the need for a comprehensive federal COVID-19 regulation, two
types of legislative change should be priorities in order to enhance the rights
of FE workers in this setting.
A. An Industry-Wide or Sectoral Approach
to Safety and Health Protection
The COVID-19 crisis illustrates how serious risks to employee safety and
health arise in occupation-wide or industry-wide terms. Because such
challenges are shared across firms in distinct occupational sectors, public
policy responses must prominently include a sector-based framework. As
other labor law and labor relations scholars have observed, sectoral
responses can generate time and cost savings when compared to a
firm-specific approach, while also amplifying workers’ role in the
policymaking process.177 The savings derive primarily from overarching
norms that reduce or remove safety and health compliance costs from
firm-specific competition. Amplified worker voice results from a sectoral
structure that assures an equal or comparable role for labor, engaging with

[https://perma.cc/LM6R-MTSQ]. For a summary of the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic, with
global deaths estimated at over 50 million including 675,000 in the United States, see History
of 1918 Flu Pandemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 21, 2018),
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/1918-commemoration/1918-pandemic-history.
htm [https://perma.cc/B9G5-QAP6].
176. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(c), discussed supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., SHARON BLOCK & BENJAMIN SACHS, HARV. L. SCH. LAB. & WORKLIFE
PROGRAM, WORKER POWER AND VOICE IN THE PANDEMIC RESPONSE 10 (2020),
https://assets.website-files.com/5ddc262b91f2a95f326520bd/5ef2396d689c3880ec008db2_
Clean%20Slate_Worker%20Power%20and%20Voice%20in%20the%20Pandemic%20Resp
onse.pdf [https://perma.cc/24X3-MA5L]; Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J.
2, 81–89 (2016); Nelson Lichtenstein, It’s Workers Who Should Determine When Their
Workplace
Is
Safe,
AM.
PROSPECT
(Apr.
29,
2020),
https://prospect.org/labor/its-workers-who-should-determine-when-their-workplace-is-safe/
[https://perma.cc/97X8-HJHM]; see also Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening
Labor Standards Enforcement Through Partnerships with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL.
& SOC’Y 552, 559–60 (2010) (proposing to tailor enforcement strategies to particular
industries and to give unions and worker centers an ongoing role in the regulatory process).
See generally Nelson Lichtenstein, Sectoral Bargaining: Historical Roots of a 21st Century
Renewal, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON LABOR AND DEMOCRACY (Angela B. Cornell &
Mark Barenberg eds., Cambridge Univ. Press) (forthcoming 2021).
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management and government to reach agreement on the content, and
enforcement of those norms.178
i. Sectoral Approach Applicability for Safety and Health
While appeals to firm efficiency and worker voice are hardly unique to
the COVID-19 setting, safety and health as a workplace condition is
distinctly amenable to a sectoral approach. Safety protections provided to
benefit workers typically entail affirmative employer obligations — new
investment in equipment, devices, and structural alterations, along with
added human resources to install, operate, and monitor the new investments.
As with improvement or protection for employee wages, individual
employers are reluctant to absorb the cost associated with these new positive
obligations on an individual firm basis.179 The airline industry legislation

178. Legislating a sectoral approach on industry-specific safety and health norms may lead
to additional support for unionization. See Andrias, The New Labor Law, supra note 177
(contending that social bargaining at the sectoral level will empower unions to act more
generally on behalf of workers). But cf. Cesar F. Rosado Marzan, Can Wage Boards Revive
U.S. Labor? Marshalling Evidence from Puerto Rico, 95 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 127, 131, 133–
34 (2020) (contending that the relationship between sectoral bargaining and union
membership is uncertain).
179. For present purposes, the positive obligations associated with safety and health
enhancements or higher wages may be contrasted with certain negative obligations imposed
on employers — such as refraining from discrimination based on race or sex. Employers may
find it easier to comply with negative obligations, as compliance does not give rise to
distinctly new types of investment and may also contribute to greater overall efficiencies by
eliminating classifications that are on their face irrelevant to job performance. See generally
James J. Heckman & J. Hoult Verkerke, Racial Disparity and Employment Discrimination
Law: An Economic Perspective, 8 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 276, 290, 297–98 (1990) (discussing
how Title VII expanded the pool of available workers for southern textile plants and helped
keep the industry initially competitive in the face of foreign competition). At an international
level, there is evidence that garment factories in several Southeast Asian countries have
achieved high compliance with norms of refraining from child labor and forced labor, and
high or moderate compliance with norms of refraining from sex and race discrimination; their
greatest area of non-compliance is occupational safety and health. See INT’L LABOUR ORG. &
INT’L FIN. CORP., BETTERFACTORIES CAMBODIA: ANNUAL REPORT 2018 AN INDUSTRY AND
COMPLIANCE
REVIEW
5–6
(2018),
https://betterwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/BFC-Annual-Report-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JTU4-V2PM]; INT’L LABOUR ORG. & INT’L FIN. CORP., BETTERWORK:
ANNUAL REPORT 2018 AN INDUSTRY AND COMPLIANCE REVIEW INDONESIA 7–8 (2018),
https://betterwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/E-FORMAT-BWI-Annual-Report-2018english.pdf [https://perma.cc/UH95-9EK3]; INT’L LABOUR ORG. & INT’L FIN. CORP.,
BETTERWORK: ANNUAL REPORT 2019 AN INDUSTRY AND COMPLIANCE REVIEW VIETNAM 4–7
(2019),
https://betterwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/BWV_Annual-Report-2019_EN_v4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PH3C-PGAH]. The Better Work Program, launched in 2007, is jointly
operated by the International Labour Office and the International Finance Corporation;
established programs exist in Cambodia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and five other countries. See
Better Work, INT’L LABOUR ORG., https://www.ilo.org/washington/areas/better-work/lang—
en/index.htm [https://perma.cc/PMF4-DMW9] (last visited Oct. 8, 2020).

42

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVIII

discussed in Section II.F suggests that a sectoral approach on wages is
workable. Even more than wage increases, firm obligations regarding safety
and health tend to arise on a less predictable basis. Relatedly, these
obligations are harder to plan and account for in straightforward monetary
terms.
In addition, government monitoring and enforcement for safety and health
obligations are more challenging and time-consuming than for wage-related
obligations. There are over eight million worksites in the United States; at
OSHA’s annual rate of roughly 32,000 inspections, it would take the agency
250 years to inspect every workplace.180
Given that government
bureaucracies lack the personnel to monitor this vast number of workplaces,
baseline safety and health norms can be successfully generated and
implemented only with suitable participation from affected employee and
employer participants. And sectoral commissions or committees offer a
mechanism that can be tailored to the nature and scope of the problems
presented.
ii. Historical and Contemporary Models
There is some history in our country of turning to tripartite industrial or
occupational committees when seeking to improve wage levels. Professor
Kate Andrias has examined the role of industry committees in the early years
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).181 Comprised of an equal number
of representatives of employers and employees in an industry, as well as
members of the public, these committees successfully raised wages for
millions of workers between 1938 and 1944.182 The DOL Administrator
issued wage orders based on industry committee recommendations. The
committees — appointed for 70 different industries — met and conducted

180. For number of workplaces and federal inspectors and inspections, see Commonly
Used Statistics, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T LABOR,
https://www.osha.gov/data/commonstats [https://perma.cc/H7UC-2TPT] (last visited Sept. 5,
2020). Twenty-four states administer their own OSH programs wholly or in part rather than
depending entirely on federal OSHA. See State Plans, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T LABOR, https://www.osha.gov/stateplans [https://perma.cc/JGV6-ZDSJ]
(last visited Sept. 5, 2020). Assuming a comparable number of annual state inspections to the
federal level, there is no possibility of covering more than a miniscule proportion of
workplaces on an annual basis.
181. See Kate Andrias, An American Approach to Social Democracy: The Forgotten
Promise of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 128 YALE L.J. 616 (2019) [hereinafter Andrias, An
American Approach].
182. See id. at 678 (discussing coverage of 21 million workers under 70 distinct increases
implemented between 1938 and 1944). Under the FLSA, the minimum hourly wage rate was
to be increased from its 1938 level of 25 cents to 40 cents (a 60% increase) as rapidly as
possible in industries where it was economically feasible. See Dorothy Tuney, Ten Years
Operations Under Fair Labor Standards Act, 67 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 271, 272 (1948).
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factfinding inquiries, gathering economic data that reflected an awareness of
geographic wage variations as well as the impact of foreign competition.183
Recommendations to the Administrator resulted from compromises between
business and labor, with public members acting as referees; Andrias
describes the process as “a mix between collective bargaining and
administrative decision-making.”184 All 70 committee recommendations
supported raising the applicable wage rate; in 83% of the cases, a majority
of employer members concurred in these recommendations.185
The FLSA industry committees were focused on the review and
implementation of wage rates. This has also been true for tripartite
commissions at the state level; a recent high-profile example involved New
York’s fast-food wage board,186 and the commissions continue to operate in
several states.187 But such commissions could be structured to address safety
and health protections: either by agreeing on approaches to monitor and
enforce existing emergency or permanent regulations on an industry-specific
basis, or by recommending for approval by a relevant government
administrator an additional set of industry-tailored protections. California’s
Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) provides a possible model for this
approach.188

183. See Andrias, An American Approach, supra note 181, at 672–73.
184. Id. at 672.
185. See Tuney, supra note 182, at 272. The Administrator approved 64 of the 70 industry
committee recommendations. See id. The last wage order was implemented more than a year
before October 1945, when the 40-cent minimum wage was slated to take effect under the
FLSA. See Andrias, An American Approach, supra note 181, at 678.
186. At the direction of Governor Andrew Cuomo, the Acting State Labor Commissioner
impaneled the New York fast food wage board. See Fast Food Wage Board, N.Y. ST. DEP’T
LABOR,
https://labor.ny.gov/workerprotection/laborstandards/wageboard2015.shtm
[https://perma.cc/YTC6-VRYE] (last visited Sept. 5, 2020). The board’s hearings and
deliberations led to a substantially increased minimum wage for fast food workers. See
Mackenzie Baris, Victory! NY Fast Food Wage Board Recommends $15 Minimum Wage,
JOBS
WITH
JUST.
(July
22,
2015),
https://www.jwj.org/victory-ny-fast-food-wage-board-recommends-15-minimum-wage
[https://perma.cc/3AYK-3VTZ].
187. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-6-109(2) (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a4.7
(West 2005); see also AZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-314 (2020) (wages of minors). New York’s
wage board has not operated since 2016, but existing wage orders remain in effect. See
Andrias, The New Labor Law, supra note 177, at 84 n.443.
188. California is unusual if not unique in having included authorization to address labor
conditions such as safety and health, not simply wages. See About IWC, ST. CAL. DEP’T INDUS.
RELS., https://www.dir.ca.gov/iwc/aboutIwc.html [https://perma.cc/MBA6-M8EP] (last
visited Oct. 15, 2020).
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The IWC was established in 1913 as part of a broader set of progressivist
labor laws.189 Notwithstanding a primary wage focus, the IWC is authorized
to address safety and health conditions through its industry-specific wage
orders.190 From its earliest days, IWC wage orders included regulation of
workplace safety and health conditions, pursuant to recommendations
provided by the state Board of Health.191 Currently, there are 17 operative
IWC wage orders, covering specific industries and occupations that include
manufacturing, personal services, canning, freezing and preserving, public
housekeeping, transportation, amusement and recreation, broadcasting,
motion picture, and agricultural.192 These wage orders typically regulate
working conditions such as maintenance of uniforms, tools, and equipment;
meal periods and rest periods; change rooms and resting facilities; provision
of adequate seating; and suitable temperature controls.193 It is reasonable to
assume that such wage orders could extend to broader occupational and
health regulation, if necessary in collaboration with the state OSH Standards
Board.
The IWC is tripartite, with two representatives from unions, two from
employers, and one from the public, all appointed by the governor with
advice and consent of the state senate.194 If the Commission finds, after

189. See WELFARE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, THIRD BIENNIAL REPORT OF
THE INDUSTRIAL WELFARE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA: 1917–1918, at 293
(1919) [hereinafter EARLY IWC REPORTS].
190.
It is the continuing duty of the Industrial Welfare Commission . . . to ascertain the
wages paid to all employees in this state, to ascertain the hours and conditions of
labor and employment in the various occupations, trades, and industries in which
employees are employed in this state, and to investigate the health, safety, and
welfare of those employees.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1173 (West 1998) (emphasis added). Section 1173 further provides that
the IWC must defer to the OSH Standards Board in cases where regulations or policies of the
two state entities overlap.
191. See, e.g., EARLY IWC REPORTS, supra note 189, at 269–70 (recommendations of
Board of Health to IWC for the fruit and vegetable canning industry on lighting, ventilation,
toilets, drinking water, and seats); id. at 273–75 (IWC working condition orders on those same
subjects).
192. See 8 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, §§ 11000–11170 (1998).
193. See id.
194. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 70 (West 2020). In 2006, the IWC was not refunded following
a period of disagreement between the California legislature, which wanted to increase the
minimum wage, and the IWC, which did not. See Marjorie Fochtman, From the Experts: Will
the Revival of California’s Industrial Welfare Commission Reduce the Explosion of Wage and
Hour Litigation for California Employers?, HR DAILY ADVISOR (Mar. 1, 2007),
https://hrdailyadvisor.blr.com/2007/03/01/from-the-experts-will-the-revival-of-california-s-i
ndustrial-welfare-commission-reduce-the-explosion-of-wage-and-hour-litigation-for-califor
nia-employers/ [https://perma.cc/KZK9-XQRZ]. See generally STEVEN EGGLESTON, LABOR
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investigation including at least one public hearing, “that hours or conditions
of labor may be prejudicial to the health or welfare of employees in any
occupation, trade, or industry,” it is required to convene an industry-specific
tripartite wage board.195 That wage board considers the IWC factual
findings, as well as any other information it deems appropriate, and submits
recommendations to the Commission;196 the IWC then is authorized to
prepare its own proposed regulation that must, in turn, include “any
recommendation of the wage board which received the support of at least
two-thirds of the [board] members.”197 Following public hearings on the
proposed regulation, the IWC may issue wage orders with the force of law.198
The state bureaucracy enforces existing wage orders; there is also provision
for private enforcement by individual employees.199
The California IWC may well be the most relevant current prototype for
a sectoral approach promulgating and enforcing workplace safety and health
protections. While other historical and current examples exist, they raise
different types of challenges that can only be summarized here. In historical
terms, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) codes of fair
competition, operating from 1933–1935, were promulgated on industry-wide
bases.200 Although the worker-related focus was on wages and hours, some
codes required an employer to “make reasonable provision for the safety and
health of his employees at the place and during the hours of their

AND EMPLOYMENT IN CALIFORNIA: A GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND
PRACTICES ch. 2 § 2-2 (Matthew Bender ed., 2d ed. 2019) (describing continued applicability

of the 17 operative wage orders). The authorizing legislation remains in place — and the
Department of Industrial Relations has amended and republished wage orders in effect at that
time in accordance with the state’s ongoing minimum wage increase schedule — although
working condition changes are not included in the ongoing adjustments. See CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 1182.13 (West 2007). Application of the existing wage orders, including for non-wage
conditions in effect as of 2006, remains the subject of litigation. See, e.g., Lazarin v. Superior
Court, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1560, 1575–78 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (invalidating an exemption from
a specific wage order that had relieved employers from obligation to provide a second meal
break).
195. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1178.5(b) (West 1980). See generally id. § 1178.
196. See id.
197. Id. § 1178.5(c).
198. See id. §§ 2699(a), (f)(2).
199. Existing wage orders carry civil penalties, to be enforced by the Division of Labor
Standards Enforcement (DSLE). The DSLE periodically issues Opinion Letters, which are
given deference in interpreting the wage orders. See Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 105 Cal.
Rptr.2d 59, 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). Individual employees may file a civil action against an
employer to recover penalties of $100 for the first violation and $200 for subsequent
violations, per employee per pay period. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2699(a), (f)(2) (West 2016).
200. See ELLIS HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN
ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 57 (1966).
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employment.”201 Apart from issues of unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power to private groups with minimal executive branch control,202
the codes themselves were not really a tripartite product. They were
essentially voluntary business initiatives, drafted with relatively little input
from labor interests or experienced government bureaucrats, and lacking a
genuine enforcement mechanism.203
By contrast, the National War Labor Board (NWLB), created in 1942 and
charged with resolving labor-management disputes in order to prevent work
stoppages that might impede the war effort, was truly tripartite in structure
and operation.204 In connection with that mission, the federal government
carried out dozens of seizures of private enterprises from 1942–1946.205 The
Board’s function, however, was primarily adjudicative — to issue directive
orders determining outcomes in these wartime labor disputes.206 The NWLB

201. NAT’L RECOVERY ADMIN., CODE OF FAIR COMPETITION FOR THE WHOLESALE COAL
INDUSTRY 416 (1934). For other codes with similar safety and health provisions, see, e.g.,
NAT’L RECOVERY ADMIN., CODE OF FAIR COMPETITION FOR THE LYE INDUSTRY 225 (1934)
(“Each employer shall make reasonable provision for the safety and health of his employees
at the place and during the hours of their employment, and shall list with the Code Authority
all occupations of a dangerous nature.”); NAT’L RECOVERY ADMIN., CODE OF FAIR
COMPETITION FOR THE ZINC INDUSTRY 45 (1935) (“Every employer shall provide for the safety
and health of employees during the hours and at the places of their employment. Standards
for safety and health shall be submitted by the Code Authority to the Board within three (3)
months after the effective date of this Code.” ).
202. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537, 541–42
(1935).
203. See, e.g., HAWLEY, supra note 200; Rudolph Peritz, Three Visions of Managed
Competition, 1920–1950, 39 ANTITRUST BULL. 273, 279 (1994); Michael L. Wachter, Labor
Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive World, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 599–600
(2007). Labor did play a larger role in aspects of implementation and enforcement. See COLIN
GORDON, NEW DEALS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, 1920–1935, at 194–203
(1994).
204. See Exec. Order No. 9017, 7 Fed. Reg. 237 (Jan. 12, 1942) (establishing the National
War Labor Board “for the peaceful adjustment of [labor] disputes”; to be composed of 12
special commissioners appointed by the President; four representative of the public; four
representative of employees; and four representative of employers; the Chairman and Vice
Chairman to be designated by the President from members representing the public).
205. The War and Navy Departments administered the seizures. While roughly half were
interventions to end unauthorized strikes by workers that disrupted war production, a
comparable number were triggered by business leaders’ willingness to disobey federal law.
See MARK R. WILSON, DESTRUCTIVE CREATION: AMERICAN BUSINESS AND THE WINNING OF
WORLD WAR II 190–91 (2016).
206. See Robert G. Dixon, Tripartism in the National War Labor Board, 2 INDUS. & LAB.
RELS. REV. 372, 381 (1949); Allan R. Richards, Tripartism and Regional War Labor Boards,
14 J. POLITICS 72, 77 (1952). Although the NWLB could not go to court to enforce its
“directive orders,” incentive to comply with an order came from the Board’s ability to refer a
case to the President, who could seize control over an offending plant or company, as well as
from the shared commitment to the war effort. See Dixon, supra note 206, at 373–74, 385;
Richards, supra note 206, at 76. For a vivid example of the presidential seizure authority in
action (including an iconic photograph), see Nelson Lichtenstein, World War II: When the
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also operated largely through 12 regional war labor boards (also tripartite).207
Such a regional structure is not well-suited to the safety- and health-related
challenges arising in modern occupations or industries.
A more contemporaneous context for sectoral application of health and
safety protections is multi-employer nationwide collective bargaining. The
National Football League Players Association has, for many years,
negotiated a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering all 30 teams.
The current CBA includes 28 pages detailing players’ rights to safe working
conditions and comprehensive medical care and treatment.208 Protections
include levels of working condition assessment and specialized prevention
and treatment that far exceed what one might anticipate for almost any other
occupational sector.209 There are CBAs with an aspiring industry-wide
scope that includes less extensive safety and health protections, as befits their
less hazardous industries.210 And examples of CBAs that impact portions of
an industry beyond the immediate signatory employer(s) include pattern
bargaining in the auto and hotel industries and multi-employer bargaining in
the construction industry.211 Still, the major challenge to a sectoral collective

Government Protected All Essential Workers, LAB. NOTES (Apr. 2, 2020),
https://labornotes.org/blogs/2020/04/world-war-ii-when-government-protected-all-essentialworkers [https://perma.cc/R5QY-ZTFP] (describing how the head of Montgomery Ward
refused to comply with a NWLB order; the union then went on strike and President Roosevelt
seized the company. The photograph is of two soldiers carrying the well-dressed CEO of
Montgomery Ward out of his headquarters and onto the street). The NWLB also had authority
to allow increases in wage and salary rates. See Richards, supra note 206, at 76.
207. See Dixon, supra note 206, at 381, 389; Richards, supra note 206, at 77.
208. See Collective Bargaining Agreement 2020, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS
ASS’N
214–42
(Mar.
5,
2020),
https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/NFLPA/CBA2020/NFL-NFLPA_CB
A_March_5_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVF3-4BNG].
209. See id. (discussing, inter alia, field surface safety and performance; required
credentials and training for various levels of club medical providers; players’ right to second
medical opinions and to the surgeon of their choice; strict regulation of blood and urine
testing; detailed protocols governing diagnosis and treatment of concussions and neck, head,
spine injuries; and programs for behavioral health, prescription medication, and pain
management).
210. See, e.g., Master Freight Agreement, INT’L BROTHERHOOD TEAMSTERS,
https://teamster.org/about/teamster-history/master-freight-agreement/
[https://perma.cc/C8U8-SYDA] (last visited Sept. 5, 2020); Writers Guild of America, 2017
Theatrical and Television Basic Agreement, ALL. MOTION PICTURE & TELEVISION
PRODUCERS,
INC.
ET
AL.
(2017),
https://www.wgaeast.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2018/10/2017_WGA_MBA-FINAL.pd
f [https://perma.cc/B6MU-38XY].
211. In pattern bargaining, a union reaches agreement on a set of terms and conditions with
one employer that then becomes the pattern for subsequent agreements with other employers
in the same industry. See generally Lynn Rhinehart & Celine McNicholas, Collective
Bargaining Beyond the Worksite, ECON. POL’Y INST. (May 4, 2020),
https://www.epi.org/publication/collective-bargaining-beyond-the-worksite-how-workers-an
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bargaining approach is that with a few exceptions like professional team
sports, CBAs do not come close to industry-wide coverage. Moreover,
industry-wide pattern bargaining is considerably more limited today than it
was a few decades back.212 This shrinkage is due to a number of factors,
including that U.S. labor law as enacted and applied over many decades has
presented serious obstacles to unionization.213
iii. Legal and Practical Questions
Sectoral approaches comparable to California’s IWC are attractive, but
they also present challenges. This Subsection briefly discusses three issues,
although more in-depth analysis is appropriate. One legal issue is whether
the tripartite structure and operation will overcome concerns raised under the
nondelegation doctrine. A federal tripartite commission, appointed by the
President with advice and consent of the Senate, seems legitimate, assuming
there is statutory clarity regarding tenure and conditions for removal.214 A
structure parallel to the IWC would have the Commission retain authority to
promulgate a sector-specific regulation after receiving recommendations
from a sectoral board. An IWC-type standard of delegated authority to
promulgate this regulation — whether current “conditions of labor may be
prejudicial to the health or welfare of employees in any occupation, trade, or
industry”215 — would be tested in light of the Supreme Court’s apparent
interest in further exploring its “intelligible principle” jurisprudence.216
Although current Court precedent seems consistent with an IWC-type

d-their-unions-build-power-and-set-standards-for-their-industries/
[https://perma.cc/BG86-RGR9].
212. See, e.g., JONATHAN D. ROSENBLUM, COPPER CRUCIBLE: HOW THE ARIZONA MINERS’
STRIKE OF 1983 RECAST LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN AMERICA 105–07, 218–19
(1998) (describing the breakdown of pattern bargaining in the copper industry); Audrey
Freeman & William E. Fulmer, Last Rites for Pattern Bargaining, HARV. BUS. REV. 30, 40
(1982) (describing the breakdown of pattern bargaining in the auto and rubber industries);
Harry C. Katz, The Decentralization of Collective Bargaining: A Literature Review and
Comparative Analysis, 47 INDUS. & LAB. RELS. REV. 3, 11 (1993) (reporting abandonment of
pattern bargaining in the steel industry).
213. See, e.g., JULIUS G. GETMAN, THE SUPREME COURT ON UNIONS: WHY LABOR LAW IS
FAILING AMERICAN WORKERS (2016); Andrias, The New Labor Law, supra note 177, at 25–
32; James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 1563 (1996); Cynthia Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 1527 (2002).
214. See generally Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
215. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1178.5(b) (West 1980).
216. Compare Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129–30 (2019) (plurality
opinion), with id. at 2139–41 (Gorsuch J., dissenting).
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standard,217 adding more definiteness or detail could address any ongoing
delegation concerns.
A second legal issue is how a tripartite commission and its
industry-specific boards would interface with NLRA regulation of the
private-sector workforce. If the entire structure is federal, there is no issue
of preemption. Sector-specific commission decisions, like FLSA wage and
hour determinations, can co-exist with labor-management regulation, and
presumably would supplement or complement any applicable CBA
protections. However, state commissions and sectoral wage boards may also
be part of a legislative approach, especially given that transit workers, public
school teachers, and other FE workers at state and local agencies are not
uniformly protected under the federal occupational safety and health
statute.218 If state law authorizes state-level commissions to address
private-sector industries as well as public employment, there may be
challenges brought under NLRA preemption doctrine. Supreme Court
caselaw could be seen as supportive of such challenges, based on the theory
that tripartite commission-imposed safety and health protections are a form
of state-approved bargaining, interfering with what the NLRA expects
should be left to “the free play of economic forces” between labor and
management.219
That said, prospects for success of a Machinists preemption challenge are
doubtful.220 The existence of a tripartite negotiation process through a state
commission does not mean the state is pressing its regulatory thumb on the
scale of individually bargained agreements. Rather, the result of any
tripartite effort would be a regulation of broad sectoral applicability. And
the Court has declined to limit the authority of states or local governments
to enact generally applicable employment regulation that extends beyond

217. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–76 (2001); see also Opp
Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adm’r of Wage & Hour Div. of Dept. of Lab., 312 U.S. 126, 142–46
(1941) (the Supreme Court unanimously upheld FLSA wage-committee structure against
charge of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power).
218. See 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (excluding states and their subdivisions from the definition of
“employer”). The federal statute provides that these workers may have OSHA protections if
they work in a state that has an OSHA-approved state program. See id. § 667. Twenty seven
states have OSHA-approved plans covering public-sector workers while 23 states do not. See
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., ALL ABOUT OSHA (2020),
https://www.osha.gov/Publications/all_about_OSHA.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZT6D-8ATH].
219. See Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Emp. Rels.
Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 147, 149–50 (1976).
220. For a more extended discussion of this issue, reaching the same conclusion, see
Andrias, The New Labor Law, supra note 177, at 90–92. For an in-depth analysis of labor
preemption application to tripartite lawmaking by state and local governments, see Benjamin
I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Law in Cities and States, 124 HARV. L. REV.
1153, 1197–220 (2011).
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federal levels of protection.221 Relatedly, the California Supreme Court in
1980 rejected a Machinists-based preemption challenge to the IWC on this
ground.222
Finally, there is a practical issue of whether the tripartite Commission and
its wage boards will function in ways that are unduly partisan or politicized.
Past experience of state tripartite commissions authorizing wage increases223
suggests that governors — directly or through neutral commission members
— tend to have outsized influence, as labor and management representatives
often disagree.224 This influence may be an acceptable tradeoff in
democratic accountability terms for a commission structure that incorporates
substantial labor and management participation on a sectoral basis. At the
same time, following Andrias’s earlier description of the FLSA industry
committees as a “mix between collective bargaining and administrative
decision-making,”225 a law could be drafted to bend somewhat toward
bargaining by providing for a government-appointed arbitrator to resolve
evenly divided commission outcomes. And because disagreements over
sectoral safety and health protections are likely to be more multidimensional
and complex than wage disputes, the legislation could make use of one of
three recurring designs from the interest arbitration setting: choosing
between the two sides’ final offers on each issue in disagreement, choosing
one complete package of proposals over the other, or exercising discretion
on each disputed issue.226
B. Protection for Diverse Forms of Safety and Health Protests
Unlike the need for a new legislative approach creating industry-wide
commissions on workplace safety and health, an enhanced right to protest
hazardous conditions can be achieved through modification of existing labor
law provisions. In a seminal law review article, Craig Becker examined how
the courts and NLRB have restricted the scope of protected strike activity

221. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756–57 (1985); N.Y.
Tel. Co. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Lab., 440 U.S. 519, 532–33 (1979) (plurality opinion).
222. See Indus. Welfare Comm’n v. Superior Ct., 613 P.2d 579, 600–01 (Cal. 1980)
(concluding that the Machinists preemption doctrine does not interfere with states’ authority
to set, inter alia, safety and health standards that exceed what has been bargained for in
particular agreements).
223. In addition to California, this experience includes New York, New Jersey, Colorado,
and Arizona. See supra notes 186–187.
224. See Andrias, The New Labor Law, supra note 177, at 87; Marzan, supra note 178, at
140.
225. Andrias, An American Approach, supra note 181, at 672.
226. See Barry Winograd, An Introduction to the History of Interest Arbitration in the
United States, 61 LAB. L.J. 164, 168 (2010).
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under the NLRA.227 By essentially confining protection to settings where
strikers entirely abandon their work and remain away from the workplace
until either reaching a settlement or conceding defeat,228 the law fails to
credit more limited forms of work stoppage, including slowdowns and
work-to-rule, intermittent strikes, and refusals to perform specific tasks.229
This stark binary conception is at odds with the definitional approach to
strikes under the law of many other countries.230 It also conflicts with the
approach adopted under international law, which views such limited work
stoppages as presumptively protected — with restrictions justified only if the
action ceases to be peaceful.231
The withered universe of protected strike activity under the NLRA has
special relevance in the safety and health context. More than many
conditions of employment, safety and health are quintessentially collective
goods. An individual worker’s successful assertion of the right to eliminate
an unhealthy or unsafe workplace condition has the inherent and predictable
effect of benefiting not just that worker but all similarly situated
employees.232 Further, unlike strikes for improved wages or job security

227. See Craig Becker, “Better Than a Strike”: Protecting New Forms of Collective Work
Stoppages Under the National Labor Relations Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 351 (1994).
228. The concession can take the form of one or more workers crossing the picket line, or
a broader recognition that the strike has been broken and the workers collectively return to
whatever jobs remain available. See id. at 354–55.
229. See id. at 368–69 (discussing the 1949 Supreme Court Briggs Stratton decision
deeming intermittent strikes unprotected, and the 1951 Labor Board Elk Lumber decision
refusing to protect slowdowns). For an in-depth discussion of the law of intermittent strikes,
see Michael M. Oswalt, Improvisational Unionism, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 597, 658–69 (2016).
230. See BERND WAAS, THE RIGHT TO STRIKE: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 3–5, 52–53 (Bernd
Waas ed., 2014) (contrasting the “more rigid” legal approach in the United States with
definitions encompassing various forms of limited work stoppages in Czech Republic, South
Africa, Turkey, Malaysia, Israel, Italy, Uruguay, and Germany).
231. The international jurisprudence is set forth primarily in the work of two key
supervisory bodies of the International Labor Organization (ILO) (established in 1919 and
since 1945 a part of the United Nations): the tripartite Committee of Freedom of Association
(CFA), established in 1951, and the independent Committee of Experts on the Application of
Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR), established in 1926. See Freedom of
Association: Compilation of Decisions of the Committee on Freedom of Association, INT’L
LABOUR OFF. 148 (2018), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/--normes/documents/publication/wcms_632659.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9BY-XBTW]; Giving
Globalization
a
Human
Face,
INT’L
LABOUR
OFF.
51
(2012),
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/--relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_174846.pdf [https://perma.cc/5F59-U932]. See
generally JEFFREY VOGT ET AL., THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2020)
(detailing the central role of the ILO and its supervisory bodies in developing and explaining
the international right).
232. The Supreme Court has recognized this reality in the unionized setting. See NLRB v.
City Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 832 (1984). The Labor Board has declined to endorse
the same position with respect to employees of a non-union company. See Meyers Indus.,
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protections, which often reflect prolonged perceptions of chronic
mistreatment, protests against life- or health-threatening workplace
conditions are likely to arise in more acute circumstances and without
extensive advance planning. The Supreme Court recognized this difference
when providing protection to a spontaneous walkout by non-union
employees protesting extreme winter conditions in an aluminum plant with
a broken-down furnace.233 But such protection has been largely confined to
one-off events. Even if faced with hazardous conditions over a more
extended period, workers who wish to engage in peaceful short-term or
intermittent walkouts or slowdowns to protest serious threats to their health
and safety are simply not protected strikers.234
Labor law’s existing protections for employees who refuse to engage in
unsafe work have value, but for reasons discussed earlier, their impact has
been limited. Constraints include (i) employees’ need to rely on the
Secretary of Labor to assert their refusal rights under the OSH Act; (ii)
restrictions on such refusals under the NLRA, both from no-strike
agreements that cover unionized workers and from employers’ right to
permanently replace “protected” strikers whether unionized or not; and (iii)
the uncertain meaning of “abnormally dangerous conditions for work” under
Section 502.235
In order to provide sufficient protection for FE workers and others
engaged in safety and health protests, certain interrelated changes to existing
labor law are needed. Two of these changes are addressed in large-scale
labor law reform legislation that passed the House earlier this year but is
unlikely to be taken up in the Senate.236 First, the definition of “protected
strikes” must be legislatively expanded to cover intermittent or repeated
safety-related walkouts or slowdowns, with or without a union presence.
The pending labor law reform bill includes specific language that seems able
to accomplish this goal by expanding the NLRA section on preserving the
right to strike.237 Second, the permanent replacement of lawful strikers must
Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 885–86 (1986), aff’d sub nom., Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
233. See NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14–18 (1962).
234. See Becker, supra note 227, at 376–85; Oswalt, supra note 229, at 658–65. See
generally Walmart Stores, Inc., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (July 25, 2019).
235. See supra Section II.E; supra text accompanying notes 140–149. The NLRA Section
158(g)’s ten days advance notice requirement for concerted activity by unionized employees
at healthcare facilities, see supra note 145, raises a separate procedural hurdle with respect to
urgent safety or health protests in those settings. The advance notice requirement does not
apply to non-union concerted activities at healthcare facilities.
236. See supra note 19 (discussing House passage and dim prospects for enactment in
116th Congress).
237. See Protecting the Right to Organize Act of 2020 (PRO Act), H.R. 2474, 116th Cong.
§ 12(j) (2020) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 163 to provide that “the duration, scope, frequency, or
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be declared unlawful. That U.S. law allows for such replacements has been
the subject of intense and prolonged academic criticism as well as prior
legislative reform efforts.238 The pending reform bill includes a provision
prohibiting this practice.239 Assuming the bill as a whole remains stalled in
the Senate, these two changes deserve separate consideration as part of an
effort to create meaningful safety and health protections for FE workers.
The third change to existing labor law provisions involves the language
of Section 502, which classifies any “good faith” quitting of labor “because
of abnormally dangerous conditions” as not a strike. This classification is
important because it allows workers to protest sufficiently hazardous
conditions without being subject to the no-strike provision of a collective
bargaining agreement. As discussed earlier, there is uncertainty from
previous court and agency decisions as to the contours of this standard.240
Stronger protection for FE workers could be secured if the language were
adjusted to clarify that (a) “good faith” refers to the employees’ subjective
belief supported by some objective evidence (rather than requiring evidence
that the abnormally dangerous conditions, in fact, are present), and (b)
“abnormally dangerous conditions” cover heightened risks to workers’
safety and health such as those evident for FE workers under COVID-19,
even if these conditions do not create immediate life-threatening
circumstances.
C. Protection for Immigrant Frontline Essential Workers
Although reform of the immigration laws is too complex and controversial
a subject to be taken up here, certain points are worth emphasizing. Migrant
workers, including workers who are undocumented, perform a
disproportionate amount of the FE work in a number of occupations, such as

intermittence of any strike or strikes shall not render such strike or strikes unprotected or
prohibited”).
238. For discussion of academic criticism as well as a sharp increase in the use of
permanent replacements since 1980, see James J. Brudney, To Strike or Not to Strike, 1999
WIS. L. REV. 65, 69, 69 n.22, 71–72 (1999) (reviewing JULIUS GETMAN, THE BETRAYAL OF
LOCAL 14: PAPERWORKERS, POLITICS AND PERMANENT REPLACEMENTS (1998)). For
discussion of congressional efforts at reform in 1992 and 1994 that secured majority support
in both houses but could not overcome Senate filibusters, see id. at 81–82.
239. See H.R. 2474 § 2(d). H.R. 2474 § 2(d) amended 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) to add a new
employer unfair labor practice as follows: “(6) to promise, threaten, or take any action — (A)
to permanently replace an employee who participates in a strike as defined by section 501(2)
of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (29 U.S.C. § 142(2)),” which in turn defines a
strike to include “any strike or other concerted stoppage of work by employees . . . and any
concerted slowdown or other concerted interruption of operations by employees.” Id.; 29
U.S.C. § 142(2).
240. See supra notes 148–149 and accompanying text (discussing the Board’s 1999
decision in TNS Inc.).
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agriculture, meatpacking, building and cleaning services, and home
healthcare.241 Even before COVID-19, U.S. citizens have shunned these
occupations as too difficult, dangerous, dirty, or otherwise unattractive.242
In addition, legal protections provided for FE workers do not adequately
extend to occupations in which migrants are concentrated. For instance,
agricultural workers are covered under the FFCRA, but the carve-outs for
employers with fewer than 50 or more than 500 employees exempt some
three-fourths of these workers from paid sick leave protections.243 Further,
migrants working in agriculture, meatpacking, and other industries must
endure crowded living conditions and inadequate healthcare services; the
added influence of these factors contributes to migrant workers suffering far
greater incidents of illness and death as they perform work that is deemed
essential for the country.244
The COVID-19 pandemic provides an opportunity to assure migrant
essential workers have the same safety and health protections as others on
the front lines. This should include access to sufficient PPE, hazard pay, and
paid sick leave; protection against retaliation (including threats of
deportation) when engaged in otherwise lawful safety-based strikes or
protest action; and opportunities to participate as workers on industry-wide
commissions or boards established in the future.
The proposed HEROES Act offers some of these protections.245 An
additional option involves expanding the current U-Visa program to include
immigrant workers exposed to serious workplace safety and health

241. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text.
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243. See Costa & Martin, supra note 64.
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Farmworkers,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
23,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/18/us/florida-coronavirus-immokalee-farmworkers.html?
searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/PF3H-6GJK]; Michelle A. Waltenburg et al.,
Update: COVID-19 Among Workers in Meat and Poultry Processing Facilities — United
States, April–May 2020, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION: MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY
WKLY.
REP.
(July
10,
2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6927e2.htm [https://perma.cc/T77B-Z4KH].
245. See Health and Economic Recovery Omnibus Emergency Solutions Act, H.R. 6800,
116th Cong. (2020). Provisions that would impact agricultural workers, meatpacking workers,
and other migrants, include (1) ability to receive a stimulus check with a taxpayer
identification number only, (2) shield from deportation of undocumented migrants (until 90
days after the emergency ends), (3) hazard pay for essential workers, (4) requirement that
employers with more than 500 employees provide paid sick leave, and (5) expedited green
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violations.246 Broader U-Visa coverage would allow immigrant workers to
report such hazards and violations to labor regulators without the same fear
of adverse interaction with immigration enforcement authorities.247 And
ultimately, if migrant FE workers are to receive equal treatment for the
recognized valorous nature of their continuing service, their access to a path
to citizenship should be part of further discussion on reforming our
immigration laws.
CONCLUSION
The United States is living through its worst public health crisis in more
than a century, combined with an economic and employment crisis
reminiscent of the Great Depression, and a national awakening to
fundamental racial inequalities that rival those confronted in the 1960s.
Given such a confluence of events, this Article has focused on the grave
weaknesses of our laws meant to safeguard the health and safety of workers
in the United States, and especially FE workers.
At the same time, the crises may serve as a moment of opportunity. The
country has been sensitized to the heroic role FE workers play; these men
and women need and deserve far better workplace protections, for the sake
of their health, their families, their communities, and their lives. This Article
has examined how particular reforms can reshape our regulatory approach to
workplace safety and health protections, and thereby enhance workers’
capacity to express legitimate needs and assure rights to meaningful
protection. Whether these or similar legislative measures will emerge from
the present crises — as occurred in the context of prior national emergencies
and moments of opportunity — remains to be seen.
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Enforcement (ICE) and placed in removal proceedings. See generally U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., POLICY MEMORANDUM: PM-602-0050.1
(2018),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/memos/2018-06-28-PM-602-0050.1-Gui
dance-for-Referral-of-Cases-and-Issuance-of-NTA.pdf [https://perma.cc/BM79-FQ8L].

